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Abstract 
In September 2005 the former dictator of Chad, Hissène Habré, was charged with 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture. Following an extradition request, 
Habré was arrested in Senegal – the country he had been living in since 1990, when he 
was deposed in a coup. The Senegalese government, however, did not follow through on 
the extradition order. The charges and order had not come from a Chadian court but 
rather from a Belgian judge. Faced with the delicate issue of extraditing a former African 
head of state to stand trial in the court of a former colonial power, the Senegalese 
government turned to the African Union, asking the organization to recommend how to 
try Habré.    
During the period between Habré’s arrest in November 2005 and the African 
Union’s ruling in July 2006, the Habré case appeared in the news framed in several 
different contexts. For human rights groups, the trial was not only the chance to bring 
Habré to justice; it was also a chance to further develop the legal precedent established in 
the Pinochet case. For the Senegalese government, the Belgian extradition order was a 
threat to African sovereignty.  
 The Habré case as it appears in the media and as it is framed by the involved 
parties reveals the complexities of the case, demonstrating that the Habré case is not 
simply about trying a former head of state; rather it is about the politics of war crimes, 
from the scope and limitations of international law to the emerging role of the African 
Union on the world stage. 
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I 
“Somewhere, There Is Justice”1 
Introduction 
 
 In 1982, former defense minister Hissène Habré, captured the capital city 
N’Djamena and began his eight year rule of Chad. Habré’s rise to power occurred in the 
middle of a guerilla war between the Muslim north and the Christian south that had 
erupted thirteen years earlier. The war, combined with a severe drought, undermined the 
rule of Ngarta Tombalbaye, a Christian from the south and the country’s first president 
since it had gained independence from France in 1960. In 1975, Tombalbaye was killed 
and replaced by Felix Malbum, who in turn would be replaced by the Libyan backed 
Goukouki Oueddei. 
 During this time, Chad was also at war with Libya over the Aozou strip. It is 
widely believed that the French-educated Habré was backed by the CIA to serve as a 
bulwark against Libya’s Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.2 One year after his successful coup, 
Habré, backed by the United States and France, drove the Libyans from the region. 
Despite this initial success, however, Habré’s position was far from secure. During his 
eight year reign, Habré faced a series of rebellions and the threat of Oueddei who had 
fled to the north and formed a rival government. 
 In 1990, Habré was deposed in a coup led by Idriss Déby, who would later be 
confirmed as president in Chad’s first election. Habré fled to Senegal, where he has lived 
in exile ever since. The case against Habré began almost immediately after he left office. 
In 1991, the Chadian Association of Victims of Political Repression and Crime (AVCRP) 
                                               
1 Brody, Reed. “Somewhere, There Is Justice.” International Herald Tribune. 6 Oct. 2005. 1-1.   
2 "Profile: Chad’s Hissène Habré." BBC News. 25 June 2008. 15 Feb. 2009. 
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compiled information on each of the reported victims of Habré’s regime. The following 
year, a Truth Commission report organized by the Chadian government accused Habré of 
40,000 cases of political murder and 200,000 cases of torture. The majority of these 
abuses were attributed to the Documentation and Security Directorate (DDS), the 
political police force that Habré allegedly had direct control over.  
 The most notorious of the DDS detention centers was a converted swimming pool 
called the Piscine. It was in the underground Piscine and other detention centers – one 
was reportedly in the presidential palace – where victims were tortured. According to 
Amnesty International, “the Chadian government applied a deliberate policy of terror in 
order to discourage opposition of any kind.”3 The deliberate policy of terror that was 
applied was documented in the reports compiled after Habré’s fall from power. 
Survivors said the most common forms of torture were electric 
shocks, near-asphyxia, cigarette burns and having gas squirted into 
the eyes. Sometimes, the torturers would place the exhaust pipe of 
a vehicle in their victim's mouth, then start the engine, Amnesty 
says. Some detainees were placed in a room with decomposing 
bodies, others suspended by their hands or feet, others bound hand 
and foot. One man said he thought his brain was going to explode 
when he was subjected to ‘supplice des baguettes’ (torture by 
sticks), when the victim's head is put between sticks joined by rope 
which are then twisted. Others were left to die from hunger in the 
‘diete noire’ (starvation diet).4 
 
The prisoners subjected to this treatment were often members of ethnic groups considered 
to be in opposition to the government, including the Sara, the Hadjerai, Chadian Arabs, 
and the Zaghawa. 
Despite the accusations made against Habré, the Chadian government did not 
issue an extradition order for Habré to be brought back from Senegal in order to stand 
                                               
3 "Profile: Chad’s Hissène Habré." BBC News. 25 June 2008. 15 Feb. 2009. 
4 Ibid. 
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charges. This was possibly because members of the current regime took part in the same 
abuses.5 Instead, the Chadian Association for the Promotion and Defense of Human 
Rights turned to Human Rights Watch. After conducting its own investigation, Human 
Rights Watch organized a coalition of Chadian, Senegalese, and international NGOs to 
support a complaint and a group of Senegalese lawyers to represent the case in court. 
Seven individual Chadians and one Frenchwoman (the wife of a murder victim), and the 
Chadian Association of Victims of Political Repression and Crime served as the private 
plaintiffs in a 2000 criminal complaint that was filed in a Dakar court. The complaint 
accused Habré of torture and crimes against humanity and was based on the international 
convention against torture, which Senegal had ratified in 1986. The Senegalese court, 
however, ruled that they did not have the jurisdiction to try Habré for crimes allegedly 
committed abroad. 
The Senegalese court may not have believed they had the jurisdiction to try Habré 
for crimes committed abroad, but a judge in Belgium believed otherwise. Under 
Belgium’s law of universal jurisdiction, Judge Daniel Fransen agreed to take the case. 
Judge Fransen and a police team launched a four year investigation in Chad where they 
interviewed victims and accomplices and were taken by ex-prisoners to their old cells and 
gravesites.6 In September 2005, Judge Fransen charged Habré with crimes against 
humanity and Belgium asked Senegal for Habré’s extradition. But Senegal’s president, 
                                               
5 Human Rights Watch. "The Pinochet Precedent: How Victims Can Pursue Human Rights Criminals 
Abroad." Press release. Mar. 2000. 23 Oct. 2008 
<http://http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/chile98/precedent.htm.> 
6 Ibid. 
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Abdoulaye Wade believed that the Habré case was an “African question” and turned to 
the African Union for guidance.7 
The Habré case first came to international attention through the 1998 Pinochet 
case. When the former Chilean dictator was arrested in London under a Spanish 
extradition order, human rights activists took notice. The charges made against Pinochet 
were based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, a legal principle that allows 
individuals to be prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in any country, 
regardless of where the alleged offenses occurred. In two separate court decisions, the 
Audiencia Nacional upheld Spanish jurisdiction. Although the case against Pinochet was 
dismissed when Pinochet was found mentally incapacitated, human rights activists were 
inspired to bring cases against other former dictators. When charges against Habré were 
filed in the Senegalese courts, Habré was named as one of the dictators facing legal 
action as a result of the Pinochet case.8 The case against Habré was documented in the 
media, usually through the account of Souleymane Guengueng, the vice-president of the 
Chadian Association of Victims of Political Repression and Crime and a former victim of 
the Habré regime. Habré soon became known as the “African Pinochet.” 
The media coverage devoted to the Habré case intensified when President Wade 
decided to refer the case to the African Union. While many media agents presented a 
fairly impartial view of the case, even attempting to place it in a larger historical context 
showing what the case means to international criminal law, an analysis of the media 
coverage from September 2005 to July 2006 reveals two media frames that emerged 
                                               
7 Guengueng, Souleymane, and Reed Brody. "Bring Hissène Habré to justice." Mail and Guardian 17 Jan. 
2006: 1-1. 
8 Reynolds, James. "The Pinochet effect." BBC News 14 Aug. 2000. 05 Mar. 2009 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/879887.stm>. 
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during the period between when the Belgian extradition order was issued and when the 
AU announced its decision. In discussing the use of framing in social movements 
Gamson and Wolfsfeld write, “Events do not speak for themselves but must be woven 
into some larger storyline or frame; they take their meaning from the frame in which they 
are embedded.”9 Given the influential role that media frames can play in movements, it is 
important to study the media frames that have been created in the Habré case. There are 
several media agents involved in the case and each one has used the media to promote 
their particular view. By studying both the impartial media coverage and the two frames, 
one can gain a greater understanding of the main issues of the case.  
The first frame that will be studied in this paper is the human rights frame. In 
2000, the Chadian Association of Victims of Political Repression and Crime and Human 
Rights Watch began to work together to move the Habré case forward. Over the past nine 
years, the two groups have worked together combining their respective strengths: the 
Chadian Association of Victims of Political Repression and Crime has contributed 
eyewitness accounts from victims of the Habré regime while Human Rights Watch has 
brought thirty years of experience and resources to the effort to find a court that will try 
Habré. For these activists, the effort to try Habré for his alleged crimes represents a long 
search for justice. The two groups, led by Human Rights Watch’s access to the 
mainstream media, have put a considerable amount of effort into keeping the Habré case 
in the media.  
The articles that have been produced by these activists and by sympathetic 
organizations and media agents comprise the human rights frame. The main objective of 
                                               
9 Gamson, William A., and Gadi Wolfsfeld. "Movements and Media as Interacting Systems." Annals of the 
American Acadmey of Political and Social Science 528 (1993): 114-25. 
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the activists is to put Habré on trial. During the period being studied, the activists 
involved in the case believed that having Habré tried in Belgium was the only viable 
option. Thus, the articles falling within the human rights frame advocate Senegal’s 
compliance with the Belgian extradition order. The Habré case is framed as a struggle for 
justice; emphasis is placed on the details and evidence of the abuses conveyed through 
graphic testimony from former victims, usually Souleymane Guengueng. The activists 
also make an effort to establish Habré’s guilt and Habré is frequently referred to as the 
“African Pinochet.” In order to strengthen the depiction of the case as a struggle for 
justice, the authors in the human rights frame place accounts of the case within a 
narrative structure. Not only are the details of the abuses given in news articles; attention 
is paid to profiling the two main figures in the prosecution, Reed Brody and Souleymane 
Guengueng. The analysis of the human rights frame in chapter three will focus on the 
resources and tactics of the human rights advocates, the narrative structure used in news 
coverage of the case, and why this narrative structure may have been chosen. 
The next frame that will be analyzed in this paper is the African sovereignty 
frame. President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal decided to refer the Habré case to the 
African Union because he believed that the case was an “African question” and because 
he was hesitant to set the precedent of extraditing a former African head of state to 
Europe. For some, the Habré case is not a question of whether or not justice will be 
served; instead it is part of the broader question surrounding Africa’s role in the 
international community. The articles that comprise the African sovereignty frame focus 
on the political implications of the Habré case, particularly in what the case means for 
Africa.  
 11 
Within the African sovereignty frame President Wade’s decision to refer the case 
to the African Union is seen as an act of defiance against Western attempts to control 
Africa and a chance to strengthen the political influence and effectiveness of the African 
Union. The articles in this frame, echo the statement made by President Wade that the 
Habré case is an issue for Africa, and Africa alone, to resolve. The newspaper in which 
the African sovereignty frame is found is state-run; however, this obvious bias can be 
seen as positive because it allows the reader to understand the position of some of the 
other figures in the case, the governments themselves. Belgium’s colonial past in Africa, 
especially its responsibility for widespread human rights abuses is often cited as one 
reason why Habré should not be tried in Belgium. On the other hand, the obvious bias, 
especially when viewed alongside the charges that have been made against the 
Senegalese government, calls the motives of those making these arguments into question. 
An analysis of the African sovereignty frame will examine the history of the African 
Union, including the expectations that have been placed on the organization and the 
challenges it currently faces. The significance of the Habré case to the future of the 
African Union will also be examined. 
The more impartial media coverage will be discussed first in an effort to put the 
case in context. This coverage differs from the two frames in that it does not advocate a 
particular position; rather, the authors of these articles attempt to present an impartial 
discussion of all of the issues surrounding the case. Thus in this coverage, the Habré case 
is depicted as a complex legal case that affects future human rights cases, the African 
Union’s position in the international community, and the developing field of international 
criminal law all at the same time. Brody and Guengueng are frequently quoted in these 
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articles which both incorporate elements of the human rights frame into a broader 
discussion and speak to the credibility of the two men. Likewise, President Wade and 
other members of the Senegalese government and African Union are quoted giving their 
opinions of the case, which further strengthens the position that the Habré case has 
significant political implications for Africa.  
For these reasons, the impartial media coverage can be seen as a synthesis of the 
two frames, validating the positions taken in more partial depictions of the trial by 
suggesting that both sides have legitimate arguments. On the other hand, the impartial 
media coverage also widens the scope of the Habré case by also including a discussion of 
the international legal principles at play. While Habré is depicted as the African Pinochet 
in the human rights frame, the legal implications of the Pinochet case are discussed in 
further detail in the articles found in the context chapter. The principle of universal 
jurisdiction and the significance of the application of this principle in cases such as the 
Habré case are also discussed at length. The following context chapter will focus on first 
defining the legal principles alluded to in the articles in the impartial media coverage 
followed by an examination into how these principles both affect and are affected by the 
Habré case. 
Thus, an analysis of the media coverage devoted to the Habré case reveals the 
legal and political implications of the case. If Habré is brought to trial, it will be 
considered a victory for human rights activists and supporters of universal jurisdiction. If 
the African Union successfully mediates the situation, the Habré case will strengthen the 
young organization’s standing within the international community. 
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II 
“Victims demand trial for ‘African Pinochet’”10 
Putting the Habré case in context 
 
  The events discussed in the previous chapter are essential to understanding the 
history of the case; however, the media has placed the Habré case in a larger historical 
context. In order to understand the arguments found in the human rights and African 
sovereignty frames, one must first understand the legal principles that play an important 
role in the case. The articles discussed in this chapter focus on the law of universal 
jurisdiction and the prosecution of those accused of committing war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in general and how these laws have both affected and are affected by 
the Habré case. To understand the significance of the Habré case to international law – 
specifically international criminal law – the history and meaning of universal jurisdiction, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes must be discussed. Of particular importance to 
the development of international criminal law are the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, 
the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, and the Pinochet case. The latter helped establish the 
rule of universal jurisdiction and without the Pinochet case; it is unlikely that the Habré 
case would have progressed further than the first complaints in the Senegalese courts. 
The news articles discussed in this chapter differ from those found in the 
following chapters because they attempt to address all aspects of the case. In both the 
human rights frame and the African sovereignty frame, the actors attempt to place the 
case in a larger context, showing that the case is significant to the overall struggle for 
human rights and Africa’s position in the international community respectively. The 
articles analyzed in this chapter, however, acknowledge both contexts attempting to 
                                               
10 Hancock, Stephanie. "Victims demand trial for ‘African Pinochet’" Toronto Star 6 Aug. 2007: 1-1. 
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depict what the Habré case means to the international legal community as a whole, not 
just human rights law or Africa’s political position.  
Nuremberg, Tokyo, and international personality 
 The development of international criminal law is tied to the philosophical concept 
of the self. As society moved from a collective identity to an individual identity, the 
rights and responsibilities of the individual came to be recognized.11 Legally, this has 
come to mean that individuals have certain rights that are protected under law while also 
having obligations to protect the rights of others. These rights and duties under 
international law, which make individuals and not just nation states subject to 
international law, are known as international personality.  
 The application of international personality to individuals came about in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. The principle of criminal responsibility of 
individuals for breaches of international law was found prior to the charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal; however, it was only in the Nuremberg trial that the principle was 
given formal recognition.12 This principle was also recognized in the charter of the Tokyo 
War Crimes Tribunal. After the precedent set by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, 
international law began to impose personal obligations on individuals separately attached 
from those attached to the state which they represented. War crimes, crimes against the 
peace, and crimes against humanity have become crimes for which an individual is 
personally responsible for under international law, irrespective of the laws of his or her 
own country.13 
                                               
11 Mettraux, Guenael, ed. Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial. London: Oxford UP, 2008. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Dixon, Martin. Textbook on International Law (Sixth Edition). Oxford University Press, London, 
England. 2007. 
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 While there is a certain degree of overlap between war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, there are several key distinctions between the two. War crimes refer to acts 
committed in violation of the laws and customs that govern the conduct of war. The 
Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 set out the basic rules and customs of war while also 
introducing the concept of crimes against humanity. The Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, however, was the first instance where crimes against humanity codified 
expression. The preamble to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 invoked the laws of 
humanity and the Convention ruled that prisoners of war and civilians of hostile nations 
must be treated humanely; but it was the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal that formally 
established a category of criminal offenses under the name “crimes against humanity.”14` 
Crimes against humanity encompass more than war crimes: they include crimes 
committed against the belligerent nation’s own nationals as well as the citizens of the 
enemy nation, the persecution of an identifiable group of people for reasons of race, 
religion and so forth, and civilian targeted atrocities that take place during war and peace. 
While the last component was not included in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, the 
two tribunals marked a significant step in the development of individual international 
personality and the crimes for which individuals can be held accountable.15 
 Hissène Habré has been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
These charges pertain to the war fought against Libya during Habré’s tenure as president 
of Chad. Like other international criminal cases, Habré is accused of committing these 
human rights abuses against his own people. Habré is accused of having direct control 
over the DDS and is therefore being held accountable for the police organization’s 
                                               
14 Mettraux, Guenael, ed. Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial. London: Oxford UP, 2008. 
15 Totani, Yuma. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008. 
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alleged torture of political prisoners.16 In particular, the DDS is accused of targeting 
members of ethnic groups that opposed the government’s policies; thus, the charges 
against Habré fall under the first and second components of crimes against humanity 
described above.17 Additionally, the precedent set by previous international criminal 
cases, including the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals, establishes that Habré 
cannot claim immunity as a former head of state. 
The Pinochet Precedent and universal jurisdiction 
 Dixon writes that “under international law, there are certain crimes that are 
regarded as so destructive of the international order that any state may exercise 
jurisdiction in respect of them.”18 Generally, the crimes considered to fall into this 
category include genocide, torture, war crimes, piracy, crimes against humanity, and in 
some cases hostage taking and hijacking. In theory, a person accused of one of these 
offenses can be tried in any court; however, as Dixon writes, “the precise reach of 
universal jurisdiction has not been determined by the International Court of Justice.”19 
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) serves as the main judicial agent of the 
United Nations. It was founded in the UN Charter of 1945 and serves to adjudicate cases 
brought between states.20 Individuals cannot be named parties in ICJ cases; however, they 
can be prosecuted in the International Criminal Court, which was established in 2002. 
 One of the first cases to utilize universal jurisdiction was that of General Augusto 
Pinochet, the former dictator of Chile. In October 1998, while in London seeking medical 
                                               
16 Farah, Douglas. "Chad's Torture Victims Pursue Habre in Court, Pinochet Case Leaves Ex-Dictator 
Vulnerable." Washington Post 27 Nov. 2000. 15 Feb. 2009 
17 "Profile: Chad’s Hissène Habré." BBC News. 25 June 2008. 15 Feb. 2009. 
18 Dixon, Martin. Textbook on International Law (Sixth Edition). Oxford University Press, London, 
England. 2007. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Statute of the International Court of Justice. Accessed April 13, 2009. 
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treatment, Pinochet was arrested on the basis of a warrant for his arrest that had been 
filed by the Spanish government. The arrest warrant was the result of two separate, two-
year investigations in Spain looking into the evidence of human rights abuses committed 
by Chile’s military regimes. Due to the political climate in Chile at the time, the victims 
were not able to bring a case against Pinochet in a Chilean court. Additionally, some of 
the victims were Spanish nationals. After the arrest warrant was issued and challenged, 
the Audiencia Nacional upheld Spanish jurisdiction in two decisions issued in November 
1998.21  
 Ultimately, Pinochet was not extradited to Spain and instead returned to Chile; 
however, this was not because the United Kingdom rejected Spanish jurisdiction but 
rather because Pinochet was found to be showing signs of dementia, making him unfit to 
stand trial. In the meantime, the Chilean courts became willing to try Pinochet and he 
returned to face similar charges in Chile and Argentina; however, in both cases he was 
once again found to be mentally incapacitated and thus incapable of standing trial.  
Although the drama of the Pinochet case was played out in 
national courts, it provided a crucial practical test of the 
seriousness and depth of the commitment by sovereign states to 
apply the principle of universal jurisdiction for certain 
internationally recognized crimes. However, the case against 
[Pinochet] was only one part of a much broader investigation. Its 
outcome […] does not signal any definitive resolution of the 
critical issues raised by the attempt to prosecute him.22 
 
The British ruling in the Pinochet case left the precise reach of universal jurisdiction still 
undefined. The Spanish court’s ruling that Spain did in fact have jurisdiction in the case 
and the fact that the case against Pinochet was dismissed for medical and not 
                                               
21 Davis, Madeline, ed. The Pinochet Case: Origins, Progress and Implications. London: Institute of Latin 
American Studies, 2003. 
22 Ibid. 
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jurisdictional issues, offers some support for a wide arm for universal jurisdiction. The 
Pinochet case has inspired other victims and human rights activists to bring cases against 
former dictators in countries willing to try them; however, the lack of a definitive ruling 
regarding Britain’s ability to extradite Pinochet shows that universal jurisdiction is still 
being developed. It will be seen in the next chapter that the Habré case is often portrayed 
in the human rights frame as an opportunity to strengthen the precedent set by the 
Pinochet case; had Habré been extradited to Belgium to stand trial or if Habré is 
eventually tried in Senegal, the case will serve as an example of the effective application 
of universal jurisdiction.  
While the Pinochet case was unfolding, Belgium was establishing itself as a 
sovereign state with a serious commitment to applying the principle of universal 
jurisdiction. Other countries have laws of universal jurisdiction; however, Belgium had 
one that was particularly broad and judges that were “unusually willing to use it.”23 By 
the end of the twentieth century, Belgium had twenty-five cases pending specifically 
related to its law of universal jurisdiction. While the law was originally praised when first 
ratified, it became controversial in 2001 when a case was brought against Israeli prime 
minister Ariel Sharon concerning the 1982 massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee 
camps in Beirut by the pro-Israeli Christian Lebanese militia.24 A Belgian appeals court 
dismissed the case, arguing for the first time that Belgium could only proceed against 
accused criminals who were physically within its territory. The ruling sparked a 
contentious debate in Belgium, as bills were presented in Parliament lobbying for and 
against returning the law to its original, wider scope. The international community 
                                               
23 “Debating Belgium’s War-Crime Jurisdiction.” New York Times. 25 January, 2003. 25 March, 2009. 
24 Sharon had served as Minister of Defense during the time of the massacres. (Ibid.) 
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became involved as well, with the governments of the United States and Israel arguing in 
favor of the court of appeals ruling and human rights advocates and Palestinian groups 
arguing against it.25 In 2003, Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law was repealed and 
replaced with a more restrictive law similar to the laws found in other countries; 
however, cases that had begun prior to the repeal, including the Habré investigation, 
continued.26 
Putting the Habré case in context 
 Unlike the two media frames, the articles featured here do not attempt to persuade 
the public. Instead, the authors of the articles in this chapter attempt to present an 
unbiased presentation of the politics and difficulties of trying Habré and by extension, 
other former rulers accused of human rights abuses. The articles in this chapter, which 
tend to be shorter than those belonging to the two frames, all contain the same elements: 
a discussion of the charges against Habré, an update on the status of the case, and a 
discussion of the legal issues of the case namely the application of universal jurisdiction. 
Specifically, the articles address the following legal issues: the legal roles of Senegal and 
Belgium in the case, the search for the proper venue to try Habré, and the issue of having 
an African head of state tried in the courts of a former colonial power.  
At times, the articles in this chapter help fill in the gaps of the case, providing 
answers to questions that have been raised in other accounts. This can be seen in the 
September 30, 2005 article published in the New York Times, “Belgium Indicts Chad’s 
Ex-Leader.” The International Criminal Court (ICC) is currently the major venue through 
                                               
25 Ibid. 
26 “Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed.” Human Rights Watch. 2003-08-01. 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/08/belgium080103.htm. 
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which war crimes and crimes against humanity cases are tried. Additionally, the court is 
located in The Hague which, like the United Nations, is considered to be a neutral 
ground. The ICC would therefore seem to solve the problem of providing Habré with a 
fair and timely trial while also avoiding postcolonial tensions. The ICC, however, is 
never mentioned as a viable option in the articles appearing in the human rights frame or 
the African sovereignty frame. This is because trying Habré in the ICC is actually not 
possible because the ICC cannot prosecute cases that occurred prior to 2002, the year its 
jurisdiction went into effect – a fact that is explained in “Belgium Indicts Chad’s Ex-
Leader.” 
While articles in the African sovereignty frame state that Senegal and President 
Wade faced international pressure regarding the Belgian extradition order, they do not 
provide specific examples. In “Ex-President of Chad Freed in Torture Case After Senegal 
Ruling,” which was published in the New York Times on November 26, 2005, the author 
elaborates on the “diplomatic quandary” President Wade found himself in at the time: 
President Déby urged President Wade to extradite Habré, claiming that Wade had 
promised to do so if asked. President Wade also risked international censure if he was 
seen as sheltering a former ruler accused of major human rights violations; however, 
President Wade was reluctant to set the precedent for extraditing former African heads of 
state to Europe. The Belgian government also stated at the time that if President Wade 
were to refuse to comply with the extradition order, Belgium could potentially invoke 
international conventions against torture signed by both countries or take the case to the 
International Court of Justice.27 
                                               
27 “Ex-President of Chad Freed in Torture Case After Senegal Ruling.” New York Times. 26 November, 
2005. 05 March, 2009. 
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This last claim is corroborated in the article, “Senegal court to rule on Habré 
extradition,” which was published on expatica.com on November 20, 2005. During the 
month of November 2005, when the Senegalese court ruled that it was not competent to 
deal with the Habré case and President Wade announced he would be referring the case 
to the AU, expatica.com published weekly updates on the case. Expatica.com is an online 
publication for Belgian expatriates. Because it is a Belgian publication directed at a 
Belgian audience, the publication also focused on Belgium’s role in the case, featuring 
quotes from members of the federal government who supported the judge’s extradition 
order. One such quote is from Justice Minister Laurette Onkelinx who stated: “The entire 
Belgian government is determined to go all the way to the end with this.”28 This quote 
from a member of the government supports the claim made in “Debating Belgium’s War-
Crime Jurisdiction” that the Belgian government was ready and willing to apply the 
principle of universal jurisdiction. This is interesting to note because the extradition order 
in the Habré case was issued only a few months after the country’s liberal universal 
jurisdiction law had been repealed and replaced with a more conservative law. 
“No Belgian trial for ex-Chad ruler Habré” and “African Union Tells Senegal to 
Try Ex-Dictator of Chad,” both provide details of the AU’s ruling. The Senegalese courts 
originally refused to prosecute Habré in 2000, citing that they did not have the 
jurisdiction to prosecute Habré for crimes committed abroad. In “African Union Tells 
Senegal to Try Ex-Dictator of Chad,” which was published in the New York Times on 
July 3, 2006, the author reports that the AU recommended that Senegal pass a law to 
allow the courts to have jurisdiction over the alleged crimes. “No Belgian trial for ex-
Chad ruler Habré,” published on expatica.com on the same day, explains the legal basis 
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for the AU decision. The AU rejected Senegal’s original claim that it did not have 
jurisdiction in the case, finding that Senegal in fact had a duty to try Habré under the 
Convention against Torture which Senegal ratified in 1986. 
Prior to the AU’s ruling, the United Nations cited the Convention against Torture 
in a ruling of its own. In “AU team in Habré Talks,” an article published in May 2006 on 
the South African news site news24.com, the author reports that the ten member UN 
Committee against Torture ruled that Dakar was in breach of international human rights 
laws because it had failed to deal with the Habré case. “UN: Senegal must extradite 
Habré,” another article published on the news24.com site in April 2006, offers a more 
detailed explanation of the UN ruling. The article explains that the 1984 UN Convention 
against Torture obliges signatories to either prosecute or extradite alleged torturers within 
their territory. The UN Committee therefore found that Senegal was breaking with 
international human rights law by not trying or extraditing Habré. The article notes, 
however, that while the committee has moral authority, it has no legal authority. The UN 
ruling therefore can do little more than put further pressure on the AU to make a decision 
that results in Habré being tried. 
The articles in this chapter provide a more detailed account of the case than the 
accounts offered in the two media frames that will be studied. This could possibly be 
because, in an effort to present a particular view of the events, the agents in the two 
frames have chosen to focus only on specific aspects of the case that fit within their 
particular frame. Within the human rights frame, where the objective is to have Habré 
stand trial, preferably in Belgium, the most important aspect of the case to highlight is the 
magnitude of the human rights abuses Habré is accused of committing. It is important to 
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note the Belgian extradition order because it proves that there is a court system ready and 
willing to try Habré but it is not necessarily important to quote members of the Belgian 
government; the order itself speaks to the government’s support of applying its law of 
universal jurisdiction in this case and so quoting an official would seem somewhat 
redundant and occupy space that could be used for further documenting Habré’s alleged 
offenses.  
The main objective of the authors in the African sovereignty frame, meanwhile, is 
to demonstrate that the Habré case should remain in Africa. Belgium’s colonial past is 
mentioned – as it is in the articles discussed here – but Senegal’s ratification of the 
international convention is not. This omission is interesting because on the one hand, it 
could be seen as useful to suggesting that the case should remain in Africa because it 
demonstrates that Senegal does in fact have jurisdiction in the case. On the other hand, 
discussing the convention could be seen as intensifying the pressure on Senegal to try 
Habré, which is portrayed as negative.  
The articles in this chapter generally take a more impartial view of the trial. The 
New York Times article “Belgium Indicts Chad’s Ex-Leader,” even acknowledges that 
Habré and his government were once supported by the United States. They document 
both the charges that have been made against Habré and the position of Habré and his 
attorneys. Two articles published on expatica.com present the two main arguments of the 
Habré defense: in “New case awaits Belgium under ‘genocide law,’” published on 
November 17, 2005, the author reports that Habré had no knowledge of the crimes being 
committed by the DDS while in “No Belgian trial for ex-Chad ruler Habré,” Habré and 
his attorneys claim that the Chadian commission that first accused Habré was politically 
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motivated. While it is highly unlikely that the commission completely fabricated the 
alleged abuses – especially since the victims of the regime are not associated with the 
current government and have brought the same charges – Habré’s claim is not completely 
unfounded since the current Chadian administration is led by Déby, the man who ousted 
Habré. Since current government officials have been accused of playing a role in the 
alleged crimes, it would not be completely unreasonable to suggest that the government 
had the motivation to place sole responsibility on Habré. The current government’s role 
in the past abuses is, according to human rights activists, one of the main reasons why 
Chad has not made an effort to try Habré. 
Because the articles in this chapter offer a fairly objective account of the case, 
they can be seen as corroborating the claims made in the human rights and African 
sovereignty frames. The human rights frame emphasizes the long search for a court in 
which to try Habré, a claim that is substantiated in several articles including, “African 
Union Tells Senegal to Try Ex-Dictator of Chad,” which describes a “winding search for 
a court to try Habré,  “Ex-President of Chad Freed in Torture Case After Senegal 
Ruling,” which claims that the Senegalese declaration of incompetence threw the case 
into a “legal limbo,” and “No Belgian trial for ex-Chad ruler Habré,” which states that the 
AU decision ended months of speculation over Habré’s immediate future. The articles in 
this chapter also quote some of the figures from the human rights frame, such as Reed 
Brody and Souleymane Guengueng, offering proof of these figures’ credibility. In articles 
announcing the AU’s decision, Brody is frequently quoted giving his opinion on the 
decision while Guengueng’s personal story is often used as a firsthand account of the 
crimes Habré is accused of committing. The article “African Union Tells Senegal to Try 
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Ex-Dictator of Chad” features a quote from another victim of the regime, Ismaïl Hachim 
Abdallah, the president of the AVCRP, who calls the AU decision a victory for human 
rights in Africa and states, “we hope to find justice at last,” adding further credibility to 
the human rights frame. 
The articles in this chapter also quote African leaders, giving voice to the 
concerns expressed in the African sovereignty frame. The political pressure placed on 
President Wade is acknowledged in many articles and in some President Wade is quoted 
explaining his decision to refer the case to the AU. In “African Union Tells Senegal to 
Try Ex-Dictator of Chad,” Wade is quoted as saying, “Africans must be tried in Africa 
[…] that is why I refused to extradite Habré to Belgium.” A similar quote is found in 
“New case awaits Belgium under ‘genocide law’” where Wade explains that he consulted 
with Nigerian president and AU chairman Olusegun Obasanjo: “I spoke with President 
Obasanjo this morning about the Hissène Habré case and I will not do anything without 
consulting the AU because this is not a Senegalese problem, but an African problem, that 
we agree on.” The framing of Habré’s case as an African question, which is the main 
focus of the African sovereignty frame, is thus acknowledged in the relatively unbiased 
media. Senegal Foreign Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio is quoted in “Habré to stay in 
Senegal until African summit” as saying that Senegal opposes impunity but believes that 
it is the responsibility of the African continent to issue a collective ruling on Habré’s 
case. By quoting agents from both frames and discussing the major themes of both 
frames, the articles in this chapter offer support for both views, underscoring the 
complexities of the case by showing that each side has valid points. 
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III 
Despot Crusade29 
The human rights frame 
 
 The 2005 Belgian extradition order was the result of nearly fifteen years of work 
on the part of human rights activists to try Habré. Survivors of the political prisons began 
gathering evidence after their release and in 1992 a Chadian Truth Commission report 
accused Habré of torture and political murders but Habré was still not brought up on 
charges. The government of Chad, implicated in the abuses as well, refused to prosecute 
Habré and some suspect presidential interference in the Senegalese court’s decision to 
dismiss the case against Habré in 2000.30 It is likely because of these obstacles that 
human rights activists decided to wage their campaign against Habré not just in the courts 
but in the media as well.  
 The product of this media campaign is the human rights frame. In this frame, the 
Habré case is constructed as a story of the search for justice. Of particular concern to 
activists is documenting the abuses suffered by political prisoners during the regime and 
Habré’s direct connection to these abuses. These elements are used in two different ways, 
depending on the source. The pieces found in the human rights frame were either 
produced by human rights activists active in the Habré case or sympathetic media agents. 
The pieces produced by the former are usually direct appeals to those in a position of 
influence, urging a specific course of action while the pieces produced by the latter have 
a more educational purpose and are aimed at the general public.    
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30 Farah, Douglas. "Chad's Torture Victims Pursue Habre in Court, Pinochet Case Leaves Ex-Dictator 
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 The pieces discussed in this chapter, with the exception of the documentary film 
The Dictator Hunter, were found in the press release section of the Human Rights Watch 
web site. These articles were selected because Human Rights Watch is one of the leading 
figures in the Habré case and therefore one of the main contributors to the human rights 
frame. Undoubtedly, the object of the press release section is to provide curious members 
of the public an easy opportunity to learn about the case, a tactic that fits with the 
activists’ efforts to generate awareness of the case. Additionally, articles appearing on the 
web site that were not authored by members of the prosecution were presumably selected 
because they present a view of the trial that is in accordance with the goals of the 
organization.  
 An analysis of the human rights frame will focus on the elements of the narrative 
presented in the frame as well as the possible reasons these elements were emphasized. 
The media coverage of the Habré case prior to 2005, in which the foundations of the 
human rights frame were laid, will be compared to the human rights frame during the 
period from September 2005 to July 2006 to demonstrate how activists responded to the 
controversy surrounding the Belgian extradition order. In discussing the narrative 
elements of the frame, the role played by key individuals and organizations will also be 
discussed.  
The Key Agents 
 According to James Jasper in The Art of Moral Protest, one of the goals of social 
movements is to change public perception. If the public is supportive of the goals of a 
movement, then the public is more likely to take action that furthers the goals of the 
movement. Strategically, media coverage can be used by activist groups to get their 
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message to the public.31 This is arguably the reason why part of the various activist 
groups involved in the Habré case have used the media to get their message to a wider 
audience. On the prosecution side, the Habré case is the work of a coalition of various 
human rights organizations. Each organization has made a unique contribution. Because 
the media coverage in the human rights frame is either created by or utilized by the 
activist organizations involved in the case, a brief discussion of these organizations is 
necessary before moving to a discussion of the media coverage they have engineered.  
 The survivors of the regime, organized through the Chadian Association of 
Victims of Political Repression and Crime (AVCRP) and the Chadian Association for the 
Promotion and Defense of Human Rights, began compiling evidence of the Habré 
government’s abuses shortly after Habré was deposed and fled to Senegal in 1990. In 
1991, AVCRP compiled information on each of the reported 792 victims of Habré’s 
regime.32 Meanwhile, the Déby government organized a Truth Commission investigating 
the Habré administration. In 1992, the Truth Commission issued a report tying Habré to 
the abuses of the DDS and accused Habré of 40,000 cases of political murder and 
200,000 cases of torture.33 Many of the members of the Habré government, including 
Déby himself, were still in power, and so the report was locked away. Fearing 
repercussions, the Chadian activists hid their own evidence in various locations 
throughout the country.34 Eight years later, when Souleymane Guengueng, the vice 
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president of AVCRP, went to Senegal to testify against Habré he did so in secret and 
against the advice of friends, who feared for his safety.35 
Given the political climate in Chad, trying Habré in Chad would be impossible 
and potentially dangerous for former victims wishing to testify. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the two Chadian human rights groups turned to an outside organization for 
aide. When the Chadian government did not issue an order for Habré’s extradition to 
Chad to stand charges, the Chadian Association for the Promotion and Defense of Human 
Rights requested the assistance of Human Rights Watch.36As an international 
organization, Human Rights Watch could pursue Habré’s prosecution without the threat 
of government interference. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch has an established and 
international reputation which would allow the organization to bring the Habré case to 
the attention of a wider audience.  
Gamson and Wolfsfeld write, “Receiving standing in the media is often a 
necessary condition before targets of influence will grant a movement recognition and 
deal with its claims and demands.”37 Both the Chadian Association for the Promotion and 
Defense of Human Rights and AVCRP are regional organizations based out of a country 
that is unwilling to pursue a case that may indict its current leaders. It is therefore highly 
unlikely that either organization would be able to generate the type of visibility that 
would enable them to achieve standing in the international media. Furthermore, 
individual members of these organizations may be hesitant to publicize their involvement 
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in the case out of concerns for their safety. An established organization such as Human 
Rights Watch, however, would have such standing.  
Founded in 1978, the non-profit, nongovernmental organization was originally 
formed to support the citizens groups formed throughout the Soviet bloc to monitor 
government compliance with the Helsinki Accords.38 Since then, the organization has 
expanded to a multinational organization that uses fact-finding investigations and 
targeted advocacy – including media coverage – to pressure governments and the 
international community to take action where human rights abuses are concerned. By its 
own account, Human Rights Watch has supported and critiqued the international 
tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, sought prosecutions for abusive leaders such as 
Augusto Pinochet, and played a prominent role in the drafting of the Rome Statute to 
create the International Criminal Court. Recently, Human Rights Watch worked with 
local rights groups in Yemen to pressure the government into releasing sixty-nine 
detainees who had been arbitrarily arrested in a conflict between the government and 
rebels in the north.39  
While Human Rights Watch has been criticized by some to be a partisan group 
and direct a disproportionate amount of its criticism toward the United States and Israel, 
the organization is frequently quoted in major media outlets.40 In reporting on human 
rights abuses, media agents such as the New York Times, BBC News, and the Washington 
Post, all cite reports issued by Human Rights Watch in their coverage of human rights 
cases. Additionally, the U.S. Department of State cites reports produced by Human 
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Rights Watch in its own reports on human rights in China, Western Sahara, Afghanistan, 
and other countries.41 In 1997, Human Rights Watch shared the Noble Peace Prize as a 
founding member of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. 
Human Rights Watch also works closely with regional groups, which can be seen 
in the organization’s involvement in the Habré case. After joining the case, Human 
Rights Watch conducted its own investigation in Chad and organized a coalition of 
Chadian, Senegalese, and international NGOs to support a complaint and a group of 
Senegalese lawyers to represent the case in court.42 In addition to working on the legal 
aspects of the Habré case, one of the organization’s attorneys, Reed Brody, is the 
coordinator of the victim’s legal team, Human Rights Watch has worked to keep the case 
in the public eye. As previously stated, all but one of the pieces discussed in this chapter 
are organized on the Human Rights Watch web site, most likely to provide the public 
with the resources to learn more about the Habré case. In the pieces not produced by 
members of the organization, the key agents in the case are quoted giving their opinion of 
the Habré case and their respective roles are discussed. Finally, it was Human Rights 
Watch that first referred to Habré as the African Pinochet, a moniker that is featured 
prominently in the media coverage of the case.43  
In the human rights frame, Guengueng and Brody are the two most visible 
individuals. Guengueng and Brody’s visibility is the result of the prominent roles both 
men play in the case – Guengueng is the vice president of the AVCRP and Brody is 
counsel with Human Rights Watch and the coordinator of the victims’ legal team. An 
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analysis of the depictions of Guengueng and Brody, which will be discussed in detail in 
the following two sections, demonstrates the relationship dynamic between the victims 
groups and Human Rights Watch. Guengueng plays a key role in the human rights frame, 
serving as the hero figure in the Habré narrative. He is featured in nearly every account of 
the case, detailing his personal experiences as a political prisoner. While there are other 
survivors involved in the case, Guengueng is the most visible. Rights officials consider 
Guengueng the most fearless of the survivors and Djekourninga Katour Lazare, secretary 
general of the Chadian Association for the Promotion of Defense of Human Rights, says 
of Guengueng, “Others tend to be more reticent […] He has always been the most 
outspoken.”44 Brody is profiled in the article “Despot Crusade,” published in the 
Associated Press, and the documentary The Dictator Hunter, but for the most part, he is 
quoted giving his opinion of Guengueng’s efforts and recent developments in the case. 
Brody’s role in the Habré narrative is indicative of the role played by Human Rights 
Watch in the case; he plays an important role but the main focus remains on the 
survivors. Guengueng and Brody also collaborate on some of the activist produced 
documents found in the human rights frame. 
Media Coverage Prior to 2005 
 The Habré case first gained international press coverage in 2000, when charges 
were brought against Habré in a Senegalese court. The case was unprecedented; it 
marked the first time that an African nation had brought charges against the former head 
of state of another country.45 It is in the early coverage of the Habré case that the human 
rights frame begins to appear. The articles studied in this section therefore serve as the 
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foundation of the human rights frame that emerges in the period between September 2005 
and July 2006; however, there are certain key differences between the articles belonging 
to the two periods. The articles published prior to 2005 present a broad depiction of the 
Habré case, the abuses allegedly committed by Habré’s government, the political issues 
obstructing the trial in Senegal, and the role of the West in the Habré government are all 
discussed in detail. The majority of these articles, with a few exceptions, are the product 
of sympathetic media agents. After 2005, however, the majority of the coverage is the 
product of those directly involved in the case. 
 This early period in the human rights frame can be understood through Gamson 
and Wolfsfeld’s finding that events take on significance from the storyline in which they 
are embedded.46 In the Habré case, the events in question are the human rights abuses 
Habré and his government are accused of committing and the work of his former victims 
and human rights groups to bring Habré to court. Human rights groups report that Africa 
accounts for fifty-five percent of torture and mistreatment cases worldwide.47 This 
statistic alone could account for the Habré case potentially escaping international 
attention; with the public hearing of so many human rights cases it can be difficult for 
one case in particular to stand out. The Habré case may be unprecedented in Africa, but 
in a media climate where coverage is devoted to international criminal tribunals such as 
those established for Rwanda and Serbia/Montenegro, this significance may be lost on 
the general public.  
 The first task of human rights activists is therefore to make the public aware of 
the case itself and why it is significant. By weaving the facts of the Habré case into a 
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narrative, human rights activists are able to organize the evidence into a structure that is 
easy for the average person who knows little about the case or international law to follow. 
Thus, the Habré case becomes the story of a tyrant guilty of atrocities against his own 
people, pursued in court by victims unwilling to rest until justice is served. This framing 
is accomplished in several ways. A narrative requires central figures, and in the early 
human rights frame the figures that occupy the hero and villain categories are 
Souleymane Guengueng and Hissène Habré. There are other figures that emerge 
including President Wade and other human rights activists such as Reed Brody, but 
Guengueng and Habré receive the most media attention. The other key element that 
emerges in the human rights frame during this early period is the placement of the facts 
of the case into a wider historical context. The efforts of human rights groups to bring 
Habré to court are depicted as examples of the often long struggle for justice while the 
legal implications of the case are simultaneously emphasized. 
 Based on the media coverage studied in this chapter, the purpose of the human 
rights frame is to garner public awareness and support for a trial. Dardis argues that 
“frame alignment – an individual’s acceptance of or agreement with at least some of the 
collective action frames advocated by an SMO [Social Movement Organization] – is 
essential in furthering a social movement’s cause […] logic dictates that achieving frame 
alignment – in some capacity – is a necessary step in guiding an individual’s beliefs and 
opinions (and therefore any subsequent actions) regarding a sociopolitical issue.”48 In his 
study Dardis notes the four functions communication and social movement theorists have 
indicated are effective in achieving frame alignment: defining an issue as a problem, 
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blaming a cause, suggesting solutions, and invoking moral appeal. Dardis reports that 
while blame is the strongest in producing frame alignment, there is some evidence to 
suggest that using all four functions can also be effective in producing frame alignment.    
An analysis of the collective media coverage in the human rights frame shows all 
four of these functions at play. The historical narrative found in these articles defines the 
issue and places blame. A violation of human rights has been committed on a massive 
scale and the person responsible for this violation has not had to face the consequences of 
his actions. Further, Habré has fled the country where he committed these abuses with a 
large portion of the Chadian treasury which he has reportedly used to buy political 
allies.49 The blame placed on Habré is twofold, not only is he guilty of human rights 
abuses, he is also guilty of obstructing justice in his case. A trial for Habré is presented as 
the solution while the details of the human rights abuses and emphasis on justice for the 
victims serve to invoke moral appeals. 
 The first set of articles that will be studied in this section includes articles that 
were not produced by human rights activists but are sympathetic to the position taken by 
said activists. Souleymane Guengueng is featured in all of these articles, helping him 
achieve international attention as one of the leaders of the movement. Without media 
attention, Guengueng would still be seen as one of the leaders; however, his story would 
remain confined to those already familiar with the case and not to the wider audience the 
human rights organizations are clearly seeking. Guengueng emerges as a hero figure in 
this frame, a depiction that is accomplished through several ways. Guengueng is first 
seen as a survivor of the horrors of an oppressive regime. In the 2001 article “He Bore Up 
Under Torture, Now He Bears Witness,” which was published in the New York Times, the 
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reasons for Guengueng’s arrest are explained. Guengueng was a civil servant who 
worked for the Lake Chad Basin Commission. When civil war broke out in Chad, the 
commission moved its headquarters to Cameroon to escape the violence in the capital 
city. Rebels passed through Cameroon, causing Guengueng to be accused of working for 
the opposition. Guengueng was arrested and spent two years in prison during which time 
he was tortured and his family was left to assume he was dead. Guengueng was only 
freed after Habré was deposed. Guengueng’s story shows that he was an innocent victim 
of an oppressive regime, subjected to inhumane treatment on weak, circumstantial 
evidence. 
 Guengueng’s ordeal in prison is also documented in “He Bore Up Under Torture, 
Now He Bears Witness.” The author reveals that Guengueng was kept in a darkened 
room which caused him to nearly lose his sight. Guengueng is usually described as 
wearing eyeglasses, the result of his treatment in prison. This detail is included in nearly 
every article concerning Guengueng possibly because it helps establish a visual image of 
the effects of torture in the eyes of the reader. In “He Bore Up Under Torture, Now He 
Bears Witness,” it is also reported that Guengueng and others were sometimes kept from 
washing and were forced to lick drops of water off the floor “like dogs.” Additionally, 
Guengueng and his fellow prisoners were not allowed to pray because the guards 
believed that the prisoners could be praying for God to kill Habré. 
 Guengueng’s experience is documented in several other articles. In “An African 
Dictator Faces Trial in His Place of Refuge,” which was published in the New York Times 
in 2000, Guengueng states that he and his fellow prisoners were sometimes placed ten 
people in a cell meant for one person. According to the article, three to four people died 
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every day from malaria, flea infestation, lack of food, suffocation, or sheer heat. In 
“Chad’s Torture Victims Pursue Habré in Court, Pinochet Case Leaves Ex-Dictator 
Vulnerable,” which was published in the Washington Post in 2000, asphyxiation and 
starvation are listed as common causes of death for prisoners. The bodies of the deceased 
were often left to decompose in the cells for two to three days afterwards. 
 Adding to the framing of Guengueng as a heroic survivor are accounts of 
Guengueng’s actions after his release. In “Face to Face with those he Tormented: War 
Crimes Trial for Tyrant of Chad,” which was published in the Independent in 2003, it is 
reported that Guengueng testified against Habré in secret using hidden documents to 
support his testimony. The reason that Guengueng was forced to hide the documents is 
given in “Chad’s Torture Victims Pursue Habré in Court, Pinochet Case Leaves Ex-
Dictator Vulnerable.” According to the article, the Truth Commission organized by the 
Déby government issued a report that charged Habré with 20,000 political murders and 
400,000 cases of torture. Because many of those still in the Chadian government, 
including Déby, are accused of playing a role in these abuses, the report was locked 
away. Fearing repercussions for their role in the investigation against Habré, the victims 
hid the evidence they had compiled in secret locations throughout the country. 
 The personal risks taken by Guengueng and others in their pursuit of justice are 
corroborated in several other articles. In “He Bore Up Under Torture, Now He Bears 
Witness,” the author reports that with Habré’s allies still in power in Chad, Guengueng 
risked his personal safety to travel to Senegal to testify. Guengueng is quoted as saying 
that his friends and family urged him not to go but such pleas left him undeterred: “When 
I left Chad for Senegal, I had accepted the idea of dying. I thought when I return to Chad 
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and get off at the airport, they can cut off my head if they want. I would die a hero. That's 
all I wanted out of life now.” Although Guengueng survived, his role in the Habré case 
eventually caused him to lose his job with the Lake Chad Basin Commission.50 In “Face 
to Face with those He Tormented: War Crimes Trial for Tyrant of Chad,” the author 
writes: “It has been an emotional journey for Mr. Guengueng, supported by Human 
Rights Watch, in his long quest for justice against the man known as the ‘African 
Pinochet.’” In the same article, Guengueng is quoted as saying, “I will not be complete 
until Habré is in jail. I can’t have psychological peace. We are doing this to prevent it 
happening again for future generations.” The sacrifices made by Guengueng, the personal 
effect of the case on Guengueng, and Guengueng’s concern for future generations all help 
contribute to Guengueng’s position within the human rights frame as one of the heroes of 
the case.  
Strengthening Guengueng’s position as a hero are quotes praising Guengueng and 
his efforts. In “Face to Face with those he Tormented: War Crimes Trial for Tyrant of 
Chad,” it is reported that Guengueng was honored at a Human Rights Watch ceremony in 
London and Reed Brody, counsel for Human Rights Watch, is quoted praising 
Guengueng’s work: “Souleymane Guengueng has harnessed his own suffering into a 
campaign to break the cycle of impunity [in] his country and all of Africa.” In “He Bore 
Up Under Torture, Now He Bears Witness,” the author offers his own praise of Habré: 
“But on a continent where ordinary men are tortured, killed and forgotten without a 
second thought, Mr. Guengueng, 52, has done something extraordinary: fought back.” 
                                               
50 “Face to Face with those he Tormented: War crimes trial for tyrant of Chad.” Independent. 17, Oct. 2003. 
10, April 2009. 
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The same article also offers an explanation as to why Guengueng is considered one of 
Africa’s most famous torture survivors and the most visible survivor of the Habré regime.  
Djekourninga Kaoutar Lazare, secretary general of the Chadian Association for the 
Promotion and Defense of Human Rights is quoted as saying, “Others tend to be more 
reticent […] He has always been the most outspoken. Guengueng’s ethos is apparently so 
high that it has enabled him to escape criticism from accepting a monetary gift from 
President Déby, which could potentially be seen as an effort on the part of the current 
administration to silence the rights groups.51  
 The significance of presenting Guengueng as one of the heroes of the rights 
movement is twofold. While organizing the events of the case into an overall narrative 
structure makes it easy for the public to follow the arguments of the activists, creating 
hero and villain characters plays into the emotions of the public. Having a hero the 
audience can both sympathize with and admire, makes the public more emotionally 
invested in the outcome of the storyline in which the events of the case have become 
embedded. If one of the goals of the human rights groups is to gain and sustain public 
interest in the case, the public must first become emotionally invested in the case. 
Additionally, emphasizing the personal risks and emotional impact of the case on 
Guengueng adds to the significance placed on the case within the frame; Guengueng and 
the other survivors would not be risking their lives and livelihoods to bring Habré to 
court if the case were not of significant importance. 
 While documenting the experiences of Guengueng and others presents 
Guengueng as a heroic survivor, the evidence cited in these articles also presents Habré 
as the villain. It is difficult to argue against the efforts of the human rights activists when 
                                               
51 “He Bore Up Under Torture, Now He Bears Witness.” New York Times. 31, March 2008. 01, April 2009 
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the treatment described above is so disturbing. The challenge for human rights activists 
both in court and in the media is proving that Habré was directly responsible for the 
atrocities committed during his time in power by his police force, the DDS.52 In the 
media, this means the issue of Habré’s guilt must move from what Gamson and 
Wolfsfeld refer to as the realm of contested discourse to the realm of uncontested 
discourse.  
One realm of media discourse is uncontested. It is the realm where the 
social constructions rarely appear as such to the reader and may be largely 
unconscious on the part of the writer as well. They appear as transparent 
descriptions of reality, not as interpretations, and are apparently devoid of 
political content. Journalists feel no need to get different points of view or 
balance when they deal with images in this realm.53 
 
Gamson and Wolfsfeld note that it is often considered an achievement for social 
movements when they move an issue from the uncontested realm to the contested realm. 
If activists can convince the public to accept Habré’s guilt as a fact, then they are more 
likely to achieve frame alignment since the public has accepted one of the functions used 
in achieving frame alignment, blaming a cause. 
In the human rights frame, this is accomplished by presenting the evidence 
against Habré. In “Face to Face with those he Tormented: War Crimes Trial for Tyrant of 
Chad,” Guengueng is quoted saying, “It was Habré who set up the political police. He 
was kept informed of everything.” This quote is paired with the information that one of 
the prisons Guengueng and others were held in was located in the presidential palace, 
presumably making it impossible for Habré to not know what was going on in at least one 
of the prisons. The evidence gathered by the survivors that reportedly links Habré to the 
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53 Gamson, William A., and Gadi Wolfsfeld. "Movements and Media as Interacting Systems." Annals of 
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actions of the DDS is referenced in all of the articles found in this section. In “He Bore 
Up Under Torture, Now He Bears Witness,” the author visits Guengueng at his home in 
Chad and Guengueng shows him the gray filing cabinet filled with evidence of the cases 
of torture compiled by the rights groups’ interviews with survivors of the political 
prisons. The 1992 Truth Commission report that accused Habré of widespread human 
rights abuses is also referenced and in “Chad’s Torture Victim’s Pursue Habré in Court, 
Pinochet Case Leaves Ex-Dictator Vulnerable,” the author quotes the report which found 
that, “There were no intermediaries between the DDS and Hissène Habré.” 
 In addition to presenting the evidence against Habré, several of the articles 
implicate Habré simply by the wording in their headlines. Habré is labeled a tyrant and 
tormentor in “Face to Face with those he Tormented: War Crimes Trial for Tyrant of 
Chad,” and a dictator in “An African Dictator Faces Trial in His Place of Refuge.” 
Judging from these articles, Habré has been tried and found guilty in the media. This can 
be seen in “Justice Denied in Senegal,” which covers the decision of the Senegalese court 
not to try Habré based on lack of jurisdiction. By saying that no trial for Habré is denying 
justice, the author indicates that Habré is in fact guilty of the crimes he has been accused 
of because justice would not have been denied if Habré were in fact innocent.  
 Jasper explains that assigning blame is an important tactic in movements because 
in order for mobilization to occur, the moral shock that has occurred must be given 
boundaries. Jasper notes that having a target makes it easier for people to conceptualize 
what they are fighting against.54 The moral shock that readers of the human rights frame 
experience is produced by the accounts of the abuses suffered by the political prisoners 
during Habré’s regime. In order for the public, and rights activists who arguably play a 
                                               
54 Jasper, James M. The Art of Moral Protest. Chicago: University of Chicago P, 1999. 
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more significant role in the case, to be mobilized, someone must be blamed. Someone, or 
some persons, must be held accountable for the human rights abuses that have been 
committed and every criminal case requires a defendant. Jasper notes that there are two 
sources of blame, causal and remedial. As the leader of Chad and the person directly 
responsible for the actions of the DDS, according to human rights activists, Habré is seen 
as the causal source because he is responsible for the abuses that have been committed. 
One of the main goals of the human rights frame in documenting the abuses committed 
during the regime and establishing the link between Habré and the DDS is to put Habré in 
this position so that the person who must be held accountable and who should appear in 
court as the defendant is Hissène Habré. 
 The human rights frame also presents remedial sources of blame – those who 
should be fixing the problem but who are not – in its narrative of the Habré case. Several 
of the articles address the roles played by the governments of Chad and Senegal, casting 
suspicions on the actions of the two. In “Chad’s Torture Victims Pursue Habré in Court, 
Pinochet Case Leaves Ex-Dictator Vulnerable,” the author notes that the 1992 Truth 
Commission report was locked away and that rights groups were forced to hide their own 
evidence, fearing reprisals. President Déby is quoted as saying that “the time for justice 
has come,” and pledging to fire all government officials with ties to the torture cases of 
the previous administration but the government’s response to the Truth Commission 
report casts some doubt on the sincerity of these claims. In the same article, it is reported 
that President Wade appointed one of Habré’s attorneys, Madicke Niang, special legal 
advisor within his government and that President Wade moved the chief investigating 
judge off of the case. The article also documents rights groups’ disappointment in the 
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Senegalese government, quoting Alioune Tine of the African Assembly for the Defense 
of Human Rights, who stated that, “This is the most important human rights case in 
Senegal's history, and we are behaving like a banana republic […] Sacking and 
promoting judges in the middle of a sensitive case are shenanigans unworthy of Senegal's 
democracy.” 
 In “Justice Denied in Senegal,” the author notes that the dismissal of charges 
“looks suspiciously like presidential interference.” Like the author of the previous article, 
the author here considers the president’s actions detrimental to Senegal’s reputation, 
noting that Senegal enjoys one of Africa’s most independent judiciaries, Senegal was the 
first nation to ratify the International Criminal Court, and that Senegalese lawyers hold 
prominent positions in judicial and human rights organizations worldwide. In “An 
African Dictator Faces Trial In His Place of Refuge,” the author remarks that it is 
impossible to know the exact scale of the abuses of the former government because the 
commission was organized by President Déby who served as military commander under 
Habré, implying that the government may be attempting to cover up their own role in the 
crimes by either minimizing the scale of the offenses or by attempting to shift all of the 
blame onto Habré. 
 Thus, Habré’s supporters and the governments of Chad and Senegal are seen as 
the remedial causes of blame in the human rights frame because of their apparent 
interference in the case. Having a remedial source of blame further harnesses the public’s 
moral outrage; not only is there a dictator guilty of human rights abuses, there are also 
those in power obstructing the pursuit of justice. The combination of these two sources of 
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blame helps move the public’s shock at the magnitude of the crimes to anger at the delays 
in the trial.    
 There are two other remedial sources of blame found in the early human rights 
frame: the United States and France. The two Western countries’ support of the Habré 
regime is mentioned in “Justice Denied in Senegal” and “An African Dictator Faces Trial 
in His Place of Refuge.” The role played by the U.S. and French governments is 
explained in detail in “Chad’s Torture Victims Pursue Habré in Court, Pinochet Case 
Leaves Ex-Dictator Vulnerable.” The author of the latter article notes that Habré was 
willing to fight Libya’s Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who was seen by the Regan 
administration as a “Soviet puppet” and supporter of international terrorism. According to 
the article, the DDS was trained by the CIA and the U.S. financially supported Habré’s 
government – even with evidence of the government’s human rights abuses. Donald 
Norland, the U.S. ambassador to Chad from 1979 to 1981 is quoted as saying, “The CIA 
was so deeply involved in bringing Habré to power. I can’t conceive they didn’t know 
what was going on.” The article also states that Norland knew Habré and tried in vain to 
get the government to back off from their support.  
 The purpose of implicating the French and U.S. in the crimes of the Habré 
government is somewhat unclear. Neither government is named as a party in the case nor 
is there any evidence to suggest that either government has interfered in the case. “Justice 
Denied in Senegal” and “An African Dictator Faces Trial in His Place of Refuge” were 
published in the New York Times and “Chad’s Torture Victims Pursue Habré in Court, 
Pinochet Case Leaves Ex-Dictator Vulnerable” was published in the Washington Post. 
Both are American newspapers with American readers. The inclusion of the French and 
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U.S. governments – particularly the U.S. government’s – role in the Habré regime may be 
to present all sides of the story; however, it also furthers the objectives of the human 
rights frame by instilling a certain degree of guilt in its readers. The public may be more 
likely to support a trial for Habré if they feel that they, through the actions of their 
government, share some responsibility for the crimes that were committed.    
 In addition to emphasizing the hero and villains of the Habré narrative, the human 
rights frame also emphasizes the legal and historic significance of the case. In “Face to 
Face with those he Tormented: War Crimes Trial for Tyrant of Chad,” the author writes, 
“It has been an emotional journey for Mr. Guengueng, supported by Human Rights 
Watch, in his long quest for justice against the man known as the ‘African Pinochet.’” 
Habré was first called the African Pinochet by Human Rights Watch.55 The link between 
Habré and Pinochet can be seen in the early articles of the human rights frame, as all of 
the articles discussed here state that the Habré case was inspired by the case brought 
against Pinochet in the Spanish court. The precedent set by the Pinochet case inspired 
human rights activists to attempt to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction to other 
human rights cases abroad including the Habré case. Comparing Habré to Pinochet, 
which appears more in the 2005-2006 period of the human rights frame, serves not only 
to depict Habré as another dictator facing his crimes; it also attempts to underscore the 
significance of the Habré case to human rights law. 
 Several of the articles in the early human rights frame narrow the historical 
context and focus on the impact a Habré trail will have on Africa rather than the 
international community as a whole. The author of “Face to Face with those he 
Tormented: War Crimes Trial for Dictator of Chad,” states that the Habré case is a 
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“landmark case which will show African dictators they should no longer assume they can 
commit human rights abuses with impunity.” The prospect of holding African dictators 
accountable is echoed in “He Bore Up Under Torture, Now He Bears Witness,” in which 
the author writes: “This [prosecuting Habré] could be done under the precedent set by the 
Pinochet case. If they succeeded – still a big if – other African despots might then think 
twice about abusing citizens at home and taking their shopping trips abroad in Paris and 
New York.” It is also found in “Chad’s Torture Victim’s Pursue Habré in Court, Pinochet 
Case Leaves Ex-Dictator Vulnerable,” where Brody argues that the case “shows that 
accountability is actually possible.”  
Meanwhile, the author of “An African Dictator Faces Trial in His Place of 
Refuge,” notes that the case is being watched closely in Africa. The author also quotes 
Delphine Djiraibe, the president of the Chadian Association for the Promotion and 
Defense of Human Rights, who remarks that the Habré case is “a message to other 
African leaders that nothing will be the same any longer […] It shows that Africa can 
also play a role in the fight for human rights and can fight on its own soil.” The author of 
“Chad’s Torture Victims Pursue Habré in Court, Pinochet Case Leaves Ex-Dictator 
Vulnerable,” notes that the charges brought against Habré in 2000 are unprecedented in 
Africa and that it is equally significant that the case has not been thrown out. In “Justice 
Denied in Senegal,” the author comments that the Habré case has energized democracy 
activists and terrified former tyrants. The author also further narrows the historic scope of 
the case by pointing out what trying Habré would mean for Senegal: “If it tried Mr. 
Habré, Senegal could make a signal contribution to human rights on a continent that has 
suffered more than any other from murderous leaders and the absence of the rule of law.” 
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Discussing the significance of the Habré case is important to the construction of 
the narrative because it puts the case within a historic context. This helps the public 
understand the issues at play in the case as well as why putting Habré on trial is so 
important. Theoretically, when paired with the hero/villain figures also established in the 
human rights frame, the historical significance of the case would help foster public 
support for Habré’s trial. The trial is portrayed as a means to rectifying the abuses 
suffered by political prisoners and as a means for holding others accountable for the same 
abuses. There is also the possibility that the trial will help prevent future abuses from 
happening, which is at one point explicitly stated by Guengueng: “I will not feel 
complete until Habré is in jail. I can’t have psychological peace. We are doing this to 
prevent it happening again, for future generations.”56   
The activist produced media during this time contains all of the elements 
discussed above, yet the “open letters” authored by the activists are addressed specifically 
to President Wade. Unlike the previously discussed articles, which are addressed to the 
general public, the two open letters discussed here focus on a specific target and make 
specific demands of that target. “Lettre ouverte des victimes au Président Wade,” 
(Victims’ open letter to President Wade) was published on August 9, 2000, in the 
aftermath of the Dakar court’s incompetence ruling. The victims’ frustration can be seen 
as they document the instances of government interference in the case:  
Par ailleurs, nous sommes plutôt surpris par la volte-face que 
semble avoir effectuée le gouvernement sur la question de la 
compétence du Sénégal dans ce dossier et plus particulièrement 
quant à ses engagements relatifs à la Convention contre la Torture. 
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10, April 2009. 
 48 
Moreover, we were rather surprised by the about face that seems to 
have been carried out by the government in regards to the question 
of Senegal’s competence in the case and particularly with regard to 
Senegal’s commitments under the Convention against Torture. 
 
The signatories – which include Souleymane Guengueng and the AVCRP as a whole – 
describe the transfer of the judge who originally charged Habré, Demba Kandji, off the 
case. The activists quote the UN Convention against Torture as proof of Senegal’s 
competence and legal obligations in the case and make it clear that they want the court’s 
ruling reversed. 
Nous faisons donc appel à vous pour vous demander de vous 
assurer que le Procureur Général affirme la compétence du Sénégal 
sur les actes de tortures commis au Tchad, conformément à la 
Convention contre la Torture.  
 
We are making this appeal to you to ask you to assure that the 
Attorney General affirms Senegal’s competence in the acts of 
torture committed in Chad, conforming to the Convention against 
Torture. 
 
The activists also refute the accusation that they are mere puppets of Western human 
rights organizations attempting to impose their values on Africa, revealing that the 
charges of Western interference were present before the Belgian extradition order was 
issued. 
 
    Rien de cela n'est vrai. Africains, nous sommes, et nous croyons en 
   la justice. Nous croyons en la justice africaine. C'est pourquoi,  
   nous avons dès la chute d'Hissène Habré commencé à réunir les 
preuves de ses crimes. Et c'est pourquoi, nous avons décidé de 
porter plainte au Sénégal. 
 
None of that is true. Africans, we are, and we believe in justice. 
We believe in African justice. That is why after the downfall of 
Hissène Habré we began to collect evidence of his crimes. And it 
is why we decided to bring a complaint against him in Senegal.  
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 Souleymane Guengueng follows a similar format in “Lettre ouverte de 
Souleymane Guengueng au Président Wade,” published in February, 2001 (Open letter 
from Souleymane Guengueng to President Wade). Guengueng again refutes the 
accusation made against the rights activists: “Monsieur le Président, que votre pays ne se 
trompe pas de combat: c'est pour la justice (et non contre un prétendu néocolonialisme 
moral de l'Occident) qu'ensemble, frères sénégalais et tchadiens, devons lutter.” (Mr. 
President, so that your country does not make a mistake in this fight: it is for justice (and 
not against an imaginary neocolonial threat from the West) that together, Senegalese and 
Chadian brothers, must fight.)  In both letters, the activists employ rhetoric of 
transcendence to refute the accusation that the trial is nothing more than the West trying 
to impose its morals on Africa; the Habré case is not simply a court case, it is a fight for 
justice that concerns all Africans. By reminding the president of Senegal’s legal 
obligations under the Convention against Torture, the activists are also arguing that 
Senegal is not only morally, but legally obligated to participate.  
 The significance of the trial is further explained in Guengueng’s letter, when he 
presents the argument that trying Habré will set a precedent showing other dictators that 
they will be held accountable for their actions. 
[…] ainsi les anciens chefs d'état, criminellement responsables de 
graves violations des droits de l'homme, ne pourraient plus, à 
l'avenir, trouver de refuges à l'étranger pour jouir d'une paisible 
retraite une fois leurs méfaits accomplis. 
 
[…] thus, former heads of state, criminally responsible for grave 
human rights violations, in the future will no longer be able to find 
refuge in foreign countries, enjoying a pleasant retirement after 
their misdeeds have been accomplished. 
 
In highlighting Senegal’s moral and legal obligations the activists continue to frame the 
case as the search for justice. By coupling an emphasis on the significance of the trial 
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with an indictment of the government’s interference, the activists are also subtly invoking 
a sense of shame; the government is obligated to join the fight for justice but has failed to 
live up to this obligation. The difference between the framing done by the media and the 
framing done by activists is that the activists directly address one audience. While 
gaining public support for their cause is important, the activists have undoubtedly 
recognized that the people in a position to actually affect the outcome of the case are 
members of the Senegalese government. The significance of using activist written open 
letters and editorials in the human rights frame will be discussed in further detail in the 
next section, where these forms of discourse play a more prominent role. 
Media coverage from September 2005 to July 2006 
 The Belgian extradition order issued in September 2005 marked an important turn 
of events in the Habré case. As seen in the articles in the previous section, human rights 
activists were cautiously optimistic that the charges filed in a Dakar court would result in 
a trial. When this did not happen, the human rights activists turned to Belgium and its 
liberal law of universal jurisdiction. Judge Daniel Fransen agreed to take the case and 
conducted a four year investigation in Chad and in September 2005, charged Habré with 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.57 Belgium then asked for Habré’s extradition, 
but the extradition was controversial from the beginning: President Wade of Senegal 
declared that the Habré case was “an African question” and refused to extradite Habré, 
choosing instead to refer the case to the African Union.58  
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 In 2005, Human rights activists believed that the Belgian courts were the most 
viable option for trying Habré.59 The pieces produced during this period contain many of 
the elements developed during the foundational period. The Habré narrative is still 
constructed as the victims’ pursuit of justice; however, during the 2005-2006 period the 
key element of the Habré narrative is no longer that in order for justice to be achieved 
Habré must be tried but that in order for justice to be achieved Habré must be extradited 
to Belgium. In order to accomplish this, the authors and director once again focus on 
documenting the abuses committed during the Habré regime and establishing Habré’s 
guilt. Guengueng is still presented as one of the hero figures of the case; however, more 
emphasis is placed on Brody here than during the previous period of media coverage. The 
main difference between media coverage from this period and media coverage from the 
previous period is the increased use of activist produced discourse found in the period 
from September 2005 to July 2006.  
 As previously stated, the original Habré narrative follows Gamson and 
Wolfsfeld’s observation that events take their significance through the frames in which 
they are constructed. The original narrative makes the events of the case significant by 
framing the Habré case as a search for justice and accountability. The basic structure of 
the Habré narrative does not change when the activists begin to advocate for Habré being 
tried in Belgium because a Belgian trial fits into the original frame’s argument. Repeating 
the same arguments strengthens the human rights frame by reinforcing the overall 
construction of the case as the search for justice. It also subtly creates a sense of urgency, 
a sense that action must be taken now because by repeating the same arguments and 
appeals, the activists show that nothing has changed.  
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 The research of Iyengar and Kinder in media priming theory has found that public 
opinion of a particular issue is affected by what aspects of that issue are primed in the 
media.60 In their studies on priming and the public’s evaluation of Presidents Reagan and 
Carter, Iyengar and Kinder found that the public’s view of both a president’s performance 
and his personal qualities depends on which aspects of national life television news 
chooses to cover and which to ignore. This can be applied to the human rights frame, in 
which the connection between international justice and Habré appearing in court is 
primed. As seen in the previous section, the articles that make up the human rights frame 
focus on Habré’s guilt and the potential end to impunity that the case could signify. Since 
repetition is often necessary for committing something to memory, it is not surprising that 
rather than making new arguments, human rights activists have simply continued to 
prime the same connections. 
Guengueng and Brody once again emerge as the two main figures in the human 
rights narrative. “Eight of Us Were Held in a Cell for A Single Person,” published in the 
Independent on September 29, 2005, was written the day after Habré’s indictment in the 
Belgian court and begins with Guengueng’s story. Guengueng’s vision is once again used 
as a vivid and lasting reminder of the torture he was subjected to while in prison. The 
author reports that Guengueng nearly lost his eyesight in jail where he was subjected to 
periods of total darkness followed by periods of intense light: “I did not know if it was 
night or day. There were eight of us in the cell built for a single person: my skin peeled 
off in the stifling heat.” Brody, meanwhile, is the eponymous figure in the documentary 
film The Dictator Hunter. The film, which was included in the 2008 Amnesty 
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International Film Festival, shows Brody’s dedication to the case and the impact that 
commitment has had on his own life. Brody was filmed for several years, during which 
time he and his family move several times. Brody’s commitment to the case is seen when 
he turns down a position with the United Nations Human Rights Commission, a position 
that Brody acknowledges would give his family more financial security. Brody, however, 
states that he cannot leave the case without seeing it through to its conclusion.  
 The Dictator Hunter also provides the public with a visualization of the human 
rights abuses committed during the Habré administration. Brody and other activists visit 
the Piscine, giving the audience a tour of the underground prison, explaining the torture 
that occurred in each room. The viewer is given the opportunity to see the conditions 
prisoners like Guengueng were held in while also being given information to picture for 
themselves the treatment the prisoners experienced. In another scene, Brody visits one of 
the mass grave sites. A group of widows meets Brody, and the viewer is able to witness a 
mourning ritual. The women weep loudly for those who were killed. The deeply 
emotional scene, allows the viewer to see the victims of the regime as individuals whose 
deaths were felt by families. After the mourning ritual, the women crowd around Brody, 
crying and embracing him, and thanking him for his work on the case.  
The mourning scene accomplishes two things. In showing the impact the Habré 
regime has had on the women and their families and their gratitude toward Brody, the 
film elicits the sympathies of the viewers. Jasper notes the importance of emotions in 
social movements, observing that emotional arousal is necessary for mobilization and 
once mobilized; emotions play a key role in sustaining involvement in a social 
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movement.61 The emotional intensity visible in the scene arouses the emotions of the 
audience, creating the moral shock Jasper argues is necessary for individuals to be moved 
to action. In doing so, the scene creates a sense of urgency, further aligning the viewer’s 
sympathy for Habré being placed on trial: Something horrible has happened to these 
women and their families and they deserve to see justice served. The image of the 
grieving women and the now empty rooms of the Piscine further enable the public to 
visualize the abuses described in the articles from the previous period of media coverage.  
The images in the documentary are also indictments against Habré, since he is 
seen as the person most responsible for the human tragedy on display. This indictment is 
found in other sympathetic media coverage during the 2005-2006 period of the case. The 
documents allegedly proving Habré’s direct responsibility for the DDS that human rights 
activists discovered are cited in “Eight of Us Were Held in a Cell for a Single Person.” 
The author states that these documents show that Habré organized ethnic cleansings and 
prove that Habré kept tight control over DDS operations. The article also references the 
investigation conducted by Judge Fransen which produced witness statements and 
included a visit to mass grave sites. Meanwhile, the author of “A Monster and a Test 
Case,” an article appearing in the Canadian newspaper the Globe and Mail, contrasts the 
inhumane treatment experienced by the government’s prisoners to the comfortable 
conditions Habré is currently living in. In the article, the DDS prisons are “ghoulish 
torture chambers and dungeons” and the prisoners once held there give “heartbreaking 
testimony.” Habré by contrast lives in “comfortable” exile in Senegal but he has “finally” 
been indicted.62  The facts of the case are framed in such a way as to create a narrative 
                                               
61Jasper, James M. The Art of Moral Protest. Chicago: University of Chicago P, 1999. 
62 "A Monster and a Test Case." The Globe and Mail 5 Oct. 2005. 15 Jan. 2009. 
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that any reader would recognize: the corrupt ruler who’s day of judgment has finally 
come. The monster in “A Monster and a Test Case” is clearly Habré, a further 
establishment of Habré as the causal source of blame.  
The legal significance of the case and the impending AU ruling in particular, is 
also discussed in the sympathetic media coverage produced during this time period. 
Brody is the subject of the Associated Press article, “Despot Crusade:”  “‘you begin with 
an idea that you're going to develop the ‘Pinochet precedent,’” says Brody, referring to 
the Chilean dictator convicted for overseeing atrocities in 1998. ‘But as you go on, you 
get to know many of the victims ... I feel like I've made a commitment to these 
people.’”63 Brody’s statement incorporates the two main arguments of the frame: the case 
is both an opportunity for Habré’s victims to finally achieve justice and an opportunity 
for human rights activists to hold other dictators accountable. Brody is also quoted in 
“‘Africa’s Pinochet’ Faces Extradition and Trial for Crimes against Humanity,” an article 
published in the Independent. The author of the article notes that if Habré is extradited to 
Belgium, “he would become the first former dictator to be extradited by a third country to 
stand trial for human rights atrocities.” Brody meanwhile states that: “This is a great day 
for Habré's thousands of victims and a milestone in the fight to hold the perpetrators of 
atrocities accountable for their crimes.” In The Dictator Hunter, Brody discusses the 
significance of the AU ruling not just to the future of international law but to the future of 
the Habré case itself, arguing that if the AU does not order Senegal to try or extradite 
Habré it will be the end of the case. 
                                               
63 As discussed in the previous chapter, Pinochet was never actually convicted. The charges against him 
were dropped in both British and Chilean courts when he was deemed medically unfit to stand trial. 
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 While the sympathetic media coverage produced during this time period 
incorporates many of the same elements used during the previous period of media 
coverage, the coverage here also contains a new element. In both “Despot Crusade” and 
The Dictator Hunter, the media agents and activists explicitly discuss the movement’s 
relationship with the media. In The Dictator Hunter, this relationship is only briefly 
touched on but its importance is difficult to miss. In one scene, Brody appears in a press 
conference in Senegal with President Wade. The latter is quoted showing his support for 
the AU’s ruling and a possible trial for Habré. Given the controversy surrounding the 
Belgian extradition order, having the president’s support of a trial in general is a gain for 
the human rights activists.  
The author of “Despot Crusade” devotes even more attention to the activists’ need 
to keep the case in the media. The author includes two quotes from Brody on the subject. 
In the first, Brody explains how media coverage can help pressure the Chadian 
government – whose support for the trial is still needed – to cooperate: “You make a big 
deal on this, say the world is watching.” In the second, Brody addresses the role the 
media plays in general: “These things don't happen unless someone digs in and pushes 
and pushes […] You just need somebody who won't give up.” The acknowledgement of 
the role the media plays in the case is interesting because it does not directly further the 
activists’ agenda. It neither indicts Habré nor does it further develop the public’s 
emotional investment in the victims’ cause. On the other hand, it does add to the 
argument that the case is significant within a wider historic context. The author of 
“Despot Crusade” notes that the Habré case has been eclipsed by other world events – 
including the genocide in Darfur – but that during the AU summit, people were talking 
 57 
about the Habré case mostly thanks to Brody’s efforts. The article can therefore be seen 
as augmenting the argument that the Habré case will mean that dictators will now be held 
accountable for their crimes because the media coverage means that their crimes will now 
no longer be forgotten in the first place. 
 The most significant development in the media coverage from this time period, 
however, is the fact that the majority of the discourse produced was generated by the 
activists themselves. The majority of the media coverage during this time period takes the 
form of editorials appearing in major newspapers written by either Guengueng or Brody. 
While no reason is given for this change, a possible explanation is the controversy 
surrounding the Belgian extradition order. The colonial history between the West and 
Africa – in which Western powers including Belgium were guilty of widespread human 
rights abuses of their own – put intense political pressure on President Wade. President 
Wade, not wanting to set the precedent of extraditing a former African head of state to 
Europe to stand trial, declared that the Habré case was an African question that concerned 
the entire continent.64 As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, there were 
other members of the Senegalese government who saw the Belgian government and 
international human rights organizations’ roles in the case as examples of the West trying 
to impose their values on Africa.  
Having Guengueng author the majority of the media activism can be seen as a 
response to these arguments since the arguments being made for Habré being put on trial 
are being made by an African personally involved in the case. The demand for Habré to 
be put on trial is therefore not Western interference but rather the efforts of Africans to 
                                               
64 “African Union Tells Senegal to Try Ex-Dictator of Chad.” New York Times. 03, July 2006. 10, April 
2009.  
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see justice served for Africans. Although Brody is American, the fact that he is frequently 
quoted both in the sympathetic media coverage found in this chapter and the more 
objective coverage discussed in the last chapter suggests that he has the necessary 
standing in the media that would result in his opinions of the case being respected by the 
international community whose support is needed for the trial. 
 This explanation is supported by an examination of the main arguments made in 
the activist produced media coverage. In “Lettre Ouverte des victims de Hissène Habré à 
la nation Senegalese,” (Open Letter from the victims of Hissène Habré to the Senegalese) 
Guengueng and other members of AVCRP directly address the Senegalese people. While 
previous open letters were addressed to President Wade, this letter is addressed to the 
general public, showing that the activists are attempting to gain public support for 
Habré’s extradition.  
Nous adressons la présente lettre à la nation sénégalaise car nous 
connaissons son soutien à ses frères tchadiens et avons confiance 
dans le fait que le Sénégal doit aujourd’hui donner l’exemple en 
prouvant au reste de l’Afrique et au monde entier qu’il est 
respectueux du droit international. 
 
We are addressing the present letter to the Senegalese people 
because we know of your support for your Chadian brothers and 
we have confidence in the fact that Senegal should set an example 
today and prove to the rest of Africa and the entire world that it 
respects international law. 
 
Guengueng and others address the charges against Habré and discuss the evidence 
proving Habré’s guilt. The authors also explain the treatment suffered by prisoners in the 
DDS prisons; however, this description takes on a more personal dimension than past 
coverage since it is coming directly from the survivors themselves: 
Certains d’entre nous ont été emprisonnés dans des conditions 
inhumaines, d’autre ont été gravement tortures, et tous ont été 
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témoins des assassints et de la soufferance subie par d’autres 
victimes n’ayant pas eu la chance de survivre à la repression 
orchestrée par l’ancien dictateur. 
 
Some of us were imprisoned under inhumane conditions, others 
were gravely tortured, and all of us were witnesses to the 
assassinations and sufferings of those victims who did not have the 
chance to survive the repression orchestrated by the former 
dictator. 
 
By speaking of their own experiences, the activists refute the claim that the case is an 
example of the West trying to impose its morals on Africa. The activists involved in the 
case are people who personally survived the abuses of the Habré government and who are 
fighting so that justice can be served for those among them who did not survive.  
 The activists also focus on Senegal’s legal obligations under the Convention 
against Torture. This is a reminder both that Senegal is legally obligated to either try or 
extradite Habré and that the protection of human rights is something Senegal has always 
valued. The latter, is highlighted in the activists’ description of Senegal’s history in the 
field of human rights law and its reputation in the international community. 
Le Sénégal, qui est le premier pays à avoir ratifié les statuts de la 
nouvelle Cour Pénale Internationale, doit aussi nous prouver, à 
nous les victimes tchadiennes, qu’il peut appliquer et respecter ses 
engagements écrits en montrant que les violations des droits de 
l’homme exercées au Tchad et que l’immunité des responsables de 
la dictature Habré sont choses du passé. De plus, nous savons que 
Monsieur le Président Abdoulaye Wade a personnellement lutté au 
Sénégal pour un gouvernement responsable et respectueux des 
droits de la personne. 
 
Senegal, which was the first country to ratify the statues of the new 
International Criminal Court, should also prove to us, the Chadian 
victims, that it can apply and respect the obligations written in the 
statue and show that the human rights violations committed in 
Chad and the immunity of those responsible during the Habré 
dictatorship are things of the past. Also, we know that President 
Wade personally fought for Senegal to have a government that is 
responsible and respectful of human rights. 
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The direct appeal from the Chadian victims to the Senegalese people frames the Habré 
case as a court case that is significant to Senegal’s reputation within the international 
community. The West is not imposing their values on Senegal because Senegal has 
always respected human rights – in fact in its role in the International Criminal Court, it 
is a leading figure in the fight for human rights – and in order to preserve this reputation, 
it must support Habré’s extradition.  
 The activists also directly address the controversy around the extradition order, 
explaining the Senegalese should support Habré’s extradition to Belgium. 
Également, nous aurions fortement espéré que le responsable de 
nos souffrances soit jugé dans un pays frère comme le Sénégal. 
Nous avions en effet placé beaucoup d’espoir dans la justice 
sénégalaise lorsque le doyen des juges d’instruction de Dakar avait 
inculpé Hissène Habré pour complicité de crimes contre 
l’humanité, d’actes de torture et de barbarie et l’avait placé en 
résidence surveillée en février 2000. La déclaration 
d’incompétence pour juger Habré pour des crimes commis à 
l’étranger par la Cour de Cassation de Dakar en mars 2001 a 
toutefois mis fin à notre espoir de voir notre ancien tyran se voir 
poursuivi dans votre pays. 
 
Equally, we strongly wished that the person responsible for our 
sufferings would be judged in a brother country like Senegal. In 
fact, we placed a great hope in Senegalese justice when the senior 
investigating of judge in Dakar charged Habré with complicity in 
crimes against humanity, acts of torture and Barbary and placed 
Habré under house arrest in February 2000. The declaration of 
incompetence in judging Habré for crimes committed abroad by 
the Court of Cassation in Dakar in March 2001 at once point an 
end to our hope to see our former tyrant pursued in your country. 
 
In describing the history of the case in the Senegalese courts, the activists convey that 
their first choice was to have Habré tried in an African court. It was only after Chad 
refused to order Habré’s extradition and Senegal declared that it did not have the proper 
jurisdiction to try Habré, that the activists were forced to look outside of Africa. 
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Belgium’s role in the case is therefore not an act of Western interference, but rather the 
last resort of a group of African activists fighting for justice. 
 Guengueng repeats this argument in “Send Habré to Belgium for Trial” and 
“Bring Hissène Habré to Justice.” In “Send Habré to Belgium for Trial,” Guengueng 
writes:  
I would also prefer to see Hissène Habré tried in Africa. But 
Senegal refused to prosecute him when it had the chance to do so, 
Chad could not guarantee him a fair trial, and no other African 
country has asked for his extradition. Some have suggested 
creating an ‘African tribunal,’ but that would entail enormous 
political will, years of delay and spending at least $100 million.  
 
Guengueng discusses the reports of President Wade’s interference in the case as evidence 
of Senegal’s refusal to prosecute when they had the chance. Guengueng and Brody also 
express concern for Habré’s rights in “Bring Hissène Habré to Justice”: 
If the goal is justice, the AU’s [African Union] choice is easy. 
After four years of work, Belgium is ready and able to hear the 
case and offers the most concrete, realistic and timely option for 
ensuring that Habré is able to respond to the charges against him 
with all the guarantees of a fair trial. Indeed, the Chadian 
government has consistently supported Habré’s extradition to 
Belgium, inviting the Belgian judge to Chad and even going so far 
as to waive Habré’s state of immunity so that he could be tried in a 
‘neutral forum’. 
 
Expressing concern for Habré’s rights shows that the main goal of the activists truly is 
justice since they are concerned that Habré have the opportunity to address the charges 
against him. If the case against Habré was not in the pursuit of justice but rather in the 
pursuit of a Western agenda, there would only be concern for finding Habré guilty and 
not for Habré’s legal rights. In addition to arguing that Belgium would provide Habré 
with a fair trial, Guengueng and Brody argue that the four years of investigative work 
Judge Fransen conducted in Chad demonstrates that Belgium is also familiar enough with 
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the case to conduct a proper trial. Finally, the authors discuss Chad’s support of the 
Belgian extradition order, implying that the order is not an unwelcome intrusion from the 
West since it is even supported by the country where the alleged offenses took place. 
While Chad’s support is potentially a contentious issue – on the one hand a guilty verdict 
would put their political enemy in prison while on the other hand the government’s own 
crimes could come to light in the trial – over all, the Chadian government’s support 
shows more of a partnership between Africa and the West rather than a neo-colonial 
patriarchal relationship. 
 Brody’s editorials meanwhile feature the same content as the other articles found 
in the human rights frame. In “Les enjeux de l’affaire Hissène Habré,” (The stakes of the 
Hissène Habré affair), Brody  writes of the Senegalese court’s decision: “Elle est 
contraire au droit international et plus particulièrement à la Convention des Nations unies 
contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains et dégradants, ratifiée 
par le Sénégal en 1986.” (It is contrary to international law, particularly the UN 
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhumane and degrading forms of 
punishment, ratified by Senegal in 1986.)  Brody also focuses on the evidence against 
Habré. In “Wake Up Call for Tyrants,” Brody writes that there are “Tens of thousands of 
documents strewn on the floor, including daily lists of dead prisoners, surveillance 
reports and arrest records, detailed how Habré had placed the DDS under his direct 
control, attacked rival ethnic groups and organized the repression of political opponents.” 
Given his standing in the media and his position as the counsel for the victim’s legal 
team, Brody appropriately focuses on the legal aspects of the case. When Brody does 
document the abuses of the Habré government, he emphasizes the role that the survivors 
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have played in their own case and not on his own efforts: “Justice came because of 
Souleymane Guengueng, a modest civil servant who watched hundreds of cell-mates 
perish from torture and disease during two years in Habré's prisons. Guengueng took an 
oath before God that if he ever got out of jail alive, he would bring his tormenters to 
justice.”65 Given the controversy surrounding Western involvement in the case, it is 
fitting that while Brody plays a prominent role in the case, the main figure in the Habré 
narrative remains Guengueng. 
 Guengueng and Brody also seem to be well aware of the subtleties involved in 
presenting their story to multiple audiences. Both Brody and Guengueng author editorials 
published in mainstream international newspapers; Guengueng’s “Send Habré to 
Belgium for Trial” appears in the International Herald Tribune, while Brody’s “Wake 
Up Call for Tyrants” was published in the Los Angeles Times and “Les enjeux de l’affaire 
Habré” was published in the French newspaper Le Monde. For a Western audience, the 
role played by Belgium and international rights organizations such as Human Rights 
Watch, is not as much of an issue. In fact, as seen in “Despot Crusade,” the main issue for 
Western audiences is making people aware of the case. Essentially, it does not matter 
which one of the two main activists in the Habré narrative is speaking; the media 
coverage discussed in the last chapter demonstrates that both men are respected.  
The same cannot be said, however, when the primary audience is an African 
audience. Because of the controversy surrounding the Belgian extradition order, it 
becomes important to emphasize the leading role played by African activists such as 
Guengueng and the AVCRP. “Bring Hissène Habré to Justice” was published in the 
South African newspaper the Mail and Guardian, accordingly, it was co-authored by 
                                               
65 Brody, Reed. "Wake-Up Call for Tyrants." Los Angeles Times 2 Oct. 2005. 
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Guengueng and Brody, presenting the relationship between the AVCRP and Human 
Rights Watch as an equal partnership. “Lettre Ouverte des victimes de Hissène Habré à la 
nation Senegalese” was authored by Guengueng and other members of the AVCRP.  
 An analysis of the human rights frame shows that the main objectives of the 
activists’ media campaign are to raise public awareness and support for trying Habré. 
This is accomplished by organizing the facts of the case into the familiar narrative of the 
victims search for justice. Within this narrative, the activists emphasize the activism of 
the survivors, Habré’s guilt, and what the trial means for human rights and international 
law in general. The controversial Belgian extradition order resulted in an increased focus 
on the activists’ efforts and Senegal’s legal obligations in an effort to refute the 
accusation made by opponents that the trial was simply another case of the West trying to 
interfere in Africa’s affairs. 
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IV 
“Des affaires comme celle-là sont des affaires africaines.”66 
(Affairs such as this are African affairs.) 
The African sovereignty frame 
 
 In “Bring Hissène Habré to Justice,” Brody and Guengueng acknowledge that 
Belgium’s colonial past is problematic for trying a former African head of state.67 Brody 
and Guengueng also acknowledge that to some African leaders, trying Habré in a 
European court would be “an insult to African dignity.”68 In the same article, Senegal’s 
president Abdoulaye Wade describes the Habré case as “an African question,” further 
highlighting the fact that for some, the case is not simply about prosecuting an alleged 
war criminal; it is also an opportunity for Africa to solidify its autonomy.  
In order to understand the main arguments of the African sovereignty frame, one 
must first understand the significance of the African Union (AU) in the international 
community. The AU succeeded the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 2002 as the 
pan-African organization aimed at promoting unity, democracy, and growth throughout 
the continent. Loosely modeled on the European Union, the AU includes a pan-African 
parliament and a Peace and Security Council that has participated in several 
peacekeeping missions. The AU has also announced plans to create a human rights court, 
a central bank and monetary fund, and by 2023 an African economic community with a 
single currency.69 An examination of the AU and the international community’s reaction 
to the AU shows that while the organization faces financial and organizational 
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challenges, there is hope that the AU will be able to make a significant positive impact on 
the continent. 
 The African sovereignty frame can be found in an analysis of the case in the 
Senegalese newspaper, Le Soleil.70 The majority of articles from the time period in 
question support Wade’s decision to refer the case to the AU. The authors do not attempt 
to refute the charges against Habré, in fact Habré himself is hardly discussed; instead the 
authors of these articles focus on what Wade and the AU’s decisions mean for Senegal 
and for Africa. 
 Le Soleil, however, is a state-run newspaper. This is both a strength and a 
hindrance to its coverage of the Habré case. Because Le Soleil is controlled by a 
government that has played a prominent role in the case, its articles enable the reader to 
understand the position taken by one of the cases’ key figures. On the other hand, the 
clear bias found in these articles means that Le Soleil presents the political implications of 
the case without acknowledging the possible political motivations behind why the 
government may be presenting this particular view.   
Some journalists believe that the Senegalese government is reluctant to try Habré, 
or has been bought by his allies, and see the delays in the case as the government’s 
attempts to avoid fulfilling its legal obligations.71 President Wade himself has been 
accused of interfering in the case.72 As seen in chapter two, President Wade removed one 
of the main investigating judges from the case while also appointing one of Habré’s 
                                               
70 There are several state-run Senegalese newspapers; however, Le Soleil was the only paper whose 
database contained articles on the Habré case during the time period in question. 
71 “Senegal doubts over Habré trial” BBC News 18 August 2008: 1-1. 
72 "Justice Denied in Senegal." New York Times 21 July 2000. 1-1. 
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attorneys his special legal advisor.73 This raises the possibility that in denouncing 
Western influence and supporting deference to the AU, the government may actually be 
attempting to shirk its legal responsibilities. 
In discussing the possible implications of the political bias found in the African 
sovereignty frame, the articles from Le Soleil will be compared to articles published on 
the News24 web site. While the articles from News24.com place more emphasis on the 
AU and its decision making process than the other articles discussed in chapter two, they 
do not take a particular position like the articles that comprise the African sovereignty 
frame. The articles from News24.com, a South African news site, are included in this 
chapter to demonstrate that the African sovereignty frame is not representative of the 
coverage given to the Habré case in the African newspapers, but rather, in only appearing 
in state-run newspapers, the African sovereignty frame has certain political implications. 
The African Union 
 The Organization of African Unity was founded in 1963 on the principles of state 
sovereignty and non-interference.74 Formed during the decolonization struggles of the 
1960s, the OAU was an opportunity for the leaders of newly formed states to promote 
political and economic growth. Instead, the OAU came to be known as “dictator’s club,” 
and the organization drew criticism throughout the 1990s for its lack of intervention in 
the crises in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia.75  
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 Conceived by Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, who proposed a “United States of 
Africa,” the African Union was formed in 2002.76 The AU consists of fifty three member 
states, although the memberships of Mauritana and Guinea were suspended after coups in 
those countries in 2008. Morocco is the only country not a member of the AU, having 
withdrawn from the OAU in 1984 after the OAU granted membership to the Saharan 
Arab Democratic Republic set up by the independence movement in the disputed territory 
of Western Sahara.77  
 The AU “supports political and economic integration among its members,” and 
lists as its aims promoting unity and peace among African nations, encouraging 
democracy and good governance, and fostering sustainable growth.”78 The AU oversees 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which attempts to strengthen 
the African economy by promoting good political and economic practices in exchange for 
aid from the West. In 2004, the AU inaugurated a pan-African parliament and a Peace 
and Security Council. The latter is an effort to reform the OAU’s policy of 
noninterference, the Peace and Security Council has the power to deploy military forces 
in situations which include genocide and war crimes and can authorize peacekeeping 
missions.  
The AU has already participated in several peacekeeping missions with varying 
degrees of success. An intervention in Burundi in 2003 was widely acknowledged as a 
success, experts say that the AU force was crucial to maintaining security during cease 
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fire negotiations; however, a successful intervention in Anjouan in 2008 attracted little 
attention outside of Africa while an intervention in Somalia was less successful.79 The 
most high profile peacekeeping effort to date has been in Darfur where the AU is 
participating in an “unprecedented joint peacekeeping operation with the UN” that is seen 
by the international “litmus test” of the AU’s effectiveness.80 
In keeping with its mission, the AU has announced a series of plans for the near 
and distant future including a human rights court, a central bank and monetary fund, an 
African economic community with a single currency by 2023, and a standby rapid 
reaction force for peacekeeping missions by 2010.81 The international community’s 
evaluation of the young organization has been mixed. “Experts say the AU has a long 
way to go before it is fully functional, and express concerns about the burdens and 
expectations that have been placed on the body thus far.”82 The AU faces “tremendous 
organizational and financial barriers.”83 The AU seeks to be funded by member nations; 
however, many of these states are battling poverty within their own borders leading to 
some doubts over whether or not the AU is able to afford the goals it has set forth. Some 
of the member states are run by dictators, which calls into question the organization’s 
commitment to promoting democracy. Additionally, critics point out that many of its 
leaders are the same people who presided over the OAU while “others say that AU 
reform and peacekeeper deployment are also subject to the will of its strongest leaders, 
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namely President Umaru Yar’Adua of Nigeria and President Thabo Mbeki of South 
Africa.”84  
In 2006, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe blocked the AU from adopting a 
much anticipated democracy charter that would have strengthened the electoral process, 
ended military coups, and stopped constitutional changes to allow presidents to stay in 
office.85 In a testimony before the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Jennifer Cooke, co-director of the Africa Program at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, discussed the present state of the AU: “This pivotal 
change is still at an early, fragile stage. The new norms are still an aspiration. They are 
often violated, as the case of Zimbabwe shows only too clearly. Implementation of the 
change remains uneven and the AU remains heavily dependent on external support.”86 
Nonetheless, Cooke remains cautiously optimistic, acknowledging that regional bodies, 
such as the European Union which has served as a model for the AU, often take time 
before significant progress is seen: “The AU experience will not be fundamentally 
different. It is equally important to note that the advent of the AU has generated high 
expectations within Africa and in the international community and has begun to generate 
some early promising returns.”87 
While the Habré case has not generated as much international attention as some of 
the other issues the AU has taken on, namely Darfur, the case does provide the AU with 
an opportunity to gain credibility within the international legal community and the 
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African political community. President Wade’s decision to refer the case to the AU 
demonstrates African leaders’ belief that the organization is equipped to address the 
political issues facing the region. As discussed in the previous chapter, Habré’s guilt is 
not debated; therefore, if the AU can be seen as bringing Habré to justice, the 
organization will gain more credibility in its efforts to promote and protect human rights 
in the area and peacefully handle regional issues.  
News24.com (South Africa) 
 Like the articles discussed in chapter two, the News24.com articles quote the 
responses of human rights activists to President Wade’s decision to refer the case to the 
AU. In “Decision on Habré case ‘OK,’” the author focuses primarily on the response of 
African rights groups. The author quotes representatives of several different 
organizations, including Sidiki Kaba, president of the International Federation of Human 
Rights, who is quoted as saying: “This is the first time that the heads of state have 
strongly affirmed that it is necessary to fight against impunity ... that appears to me to be 
helpful.” The author notes that overall, African rights groups have welcomed the 
decision. This claim is corroborated in “Senegal told to Prosecute Habré,” which was 
published on the web site on June 29, 2006. The author of “Senegal told to Prosecute 
Habré,” notes that the Coalition against Impunity, an organization composed of 300 
African and international civil society bodies, said that “the AU must force Senegal to 
abide by its international obligations and ensure Habré faced justice.” The author also 
quotes Kolawole Olaniyan, the director of Amnesty International’s Africa Program, who 
notes that “Habré’s victims have been fighting for 16 years to see justice done.” 
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 The authors of the News24.com articles also focus on the legal and historic 
significance of the Habré case. As discussed in chapter two, both “UN: Senegal must 
extradite Habré” and “AU team in Habré talks,” explain the UN ruling that Senegal 
violated the 1984 Convention against Torture by not attempting to try or extradite Habré. 
Habré’s reputation as the “African Pinochet” is noted in the latter article as well as in 
“Decision on Habré case ‘OK,’” serving as a reminder of the case’s relationship to the 
application of universal jurisdiction. In “Senegal told to prosecute Habré,” the author 
highlights the significance of universal jurisdiction to Africa, noting that the Habré court 
case will follow the trial of Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia, currently on 
trial for similar charges in The Hague. The author of “Senegal told to prosecute Habré” 
also notes that: “Few former African strongmen had [sic] faced charges for past wrongs 
and many lived [sic] comfortable lives in exile, but activists said the extradition of Habré 
would reflect a stiffening resolve on the continent to seek justice over impunity.” 
 What distinguishes the News24.com articles from other articles that attempt to put 
the Habré case in a wider context is the articles’ focus on the details of the AU 
deliberations. In “Decision on Habré case ‘OK,’” the author explains that the AU panel 
charged with making the decision is a commission of legal experts created during a 
summit in Sudan. The commission was given six months to examine “all aspects of the 
case and make concrete recommendations.” The author of “AU team in Habré talks,” 
which was published on May 22, 2006 quotes AU deputy commission chief Patrick 
Mazinklaka as saying: “They [the commission] have three days to deliberate and do the 
job, that’s why they have to be protected  from any kind of pressure.”88 This pressure is 
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other accounts of the case report that the commission was given six months to make a recommendation. 
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most likely a reference to the political pressure placed on African leaders such as 
President Wade not to extradite Habré to Belgium discussed in chapter two and discussed 
further in the next section. 
Le Soleil (Senegal) 
 Le Soleil is a French language Senegalese newspaper based out of the nation’s 
capital, Dakar. The daily newspaper covers national issues and, like many of the nation’s 
newspapers, is state-owned.89 Following President Wade’s decision to refer the case to 
the AU, Le Soleil published several pieces that were in favor of Wade’s decision. “Au-
delà de L’affaire Hissène Habré” (“On the Hissène Habré Case”) by Mamour Cissé the 
president of the social democrat party, published December 1, 2005, is the most detailed 
response to President Wade’s decision. The article raises all of the issues found in other 
pieces: what the case means for Senegal’s reputation, the reluctance to allow Habré to be 
tried in Europe, and the significance of the AU’s involvement. Cissé begins by 
acknowledging the difficult position that Senegal is placed in, especially with the 
international community watching. According to Cissé, the case puts Senegal’s very 
reputation at stake: 
Cet hôte si encombrant aux yeux des autorités sénégalaises a tout 
de même passé quinze bonnes années de sa vie dans notre pays 
réputé pour sa démocratie, sa tolérance, sa « téranga » et son 
engagement quasi sacré en faveur du respect des droits humains.90 
 
This exile, while cumbersome in the eyes of the Senegalese 
authorities, at the same time allowed Habré to pass fifteen good 
years of his life in our country known for our democracy, our 
tolerance, our hospitality and our quasi-sacred engagement in favor 
of respect for human rights. 
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Although Senegal is not without its own economic and political problems, the country 
has a reputation for democracy and has played important roles in the developing field of 
human rights law. Senegal was the first nation to ratify the International Criminal Court 
and its lawyers hold prominent positions in judicial and human rights organizations 
worldwide.91 Additionally, Senegal has a long record of participating in international 
peacekeeping missions.92 Senegal prides itself on its “téranga,” or hospitality. From 
Cissé’s perspective, Habré’s fifteen year exile in Senegal has been positive for Senegal’s 
reputation: it is another example of the country’s respect for all peoples as well as 
Senegal’s reputation as one of the few democratic countries in the region. 
 According to Cissé, extraditing Habré to Belgium would be a threat to this 
reputation. From this perspective, Habré is another refugee having come to Senegal 
because he was forced to flee his home country. Extraditing Habré to Belgium would be 
akin to denying any other displaced person seeking refuge. That Habré is accused of 
committing war crimes while in office, is only briefly mentioned at the beginning of the 
article. Cissé’s negative opinion of extradition seems to be less a reflection of his opinion 
of the charges against Habré than it is of his opinion of the West’s involvement in the 
case. Cissé’s disdain for L’Occident (the West) is clear throughout the article: 
En revanche, elles sont si promptes à déstabiliser les Etats et les 
pays africains mais demeurent aphones quand il s’agit de mefaits et 
d’autres crimes commis par les occidentaux. Lorsqu’on affiche 
toujours une indignation selective, on deviant forcément suspect. 
Loin de nous l’idée de minimiser les crimes humains, mais ils ne 
sont pas les seuls. Des crimes politiques, économiques et sociaux 
aussi souvent perpétrés par les puissances du nord.93 
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In revenge, they [the West] are quite prompt in destabilizing 
African states and countries but they are quiet when the wrongs 
and other crimes are committed by the West. Because they always 
show a selective indignation, one is forced to become suspect. Far 
be it from us to minimize the idea of crimes against humanity, but 
they are not alone. Crimes, political, economic and social are also 
frequently perpetuated by the powers of the North. 
 
The crimes committed by the powers of the North are possibly a reference to the 
genocide in Darfur; however, the focus of Cissé’s disdain is on Europe and the United 
States. In support of the above accusations, Cissé points to France and Belgium’s colonial 
pasts, the Holocaust, the United States’ refusal to ratify the Kyoto Treaty, and Israel’s 
actions in the Gaza Strip among other historic events.  
While Cissé’s observation that the West is also guilty of human rights abuses is 
valid, Cissé’s argument utilizes the tu quoque logic fallacy which weakens the overall 
argument. Cissé also has a tendency to use dramatic language, which can not only be 
seen in his accusations against the West listed above; it can also be found in Cissé’s 
denouncement of the liberal policies of the West. Cissé views the West’s involvement in 
the case as an attempt to impose Western values on Africa, something that Cissé believes 
should be avoided: “Les valeurs et croyances de l’Occident ne seront jamais les nôtres.”94 
(The values and beliefs of the West will never be ours.)  
Nonetheless, Cissé acknowledges the present limitations of the AU. While it is 
obvious that Cissé wants the Habré case to remain in Africa and supports the AU’s 
involvement in the case, Cissé acknowledges that the AU does not have a judiciary body 
to try Habré. (Cissé does not offer a recommendation of his own as to what should be 
done concerning the Habré case.) Cissé’s hopes for the AU are similar to the 
organization’s own:  
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L’installation d’une telle court est une exigence de l’heure 
parce qu’elle participle de la promotion de la dignité de 
l’Afrique et du renforcement de sa souveraineté.95 
 
The installation of such a court [High Court of Justice] is 
an exigency because it is part of the promotion of the 
dignity of Africa and the reinforcement of its sovereignty. 
 
While the High Court of Justice is not the same as the AU’s proposed human rights court, 
the idea behind the two courts – as seen in Cissé’s article – are the same. The AU’s 
human rights court would enable to try African’s accused of war crimes in Africa. It 
would also give the AU credibility as an organization committed to promoting human 
rights. Cissé’s article confirms the expectations and hopes placed on the AU reported by 
Cooke. President Wade’s decision to refer the case to the AU shows his faith in the 
organizations ability to handle the case. Additionally, Cissé’s proposal of a High Court of 
Justice is an acknowledgment on the part of the Senegalese (the government at least), that 
the AU still has work to be done before it can completely fulfill its promise. 
 “Me Abdoulaye Wade sur L’Affaire Hissène Habré: « Je vais mettre l’Afrique 
devant ses responsabilités »” (“President Abdoulaye Wade on the Hissène Habré case: I 
have put Africa at the front of its responsibilities”) was published on the same day but is 
fairly objective. The headline quote is attributed to President Wade: 
Je vais mettre l’Afrique devant ses responsabilités en présentant le 
dossier Hissène Habré au Sommet des chefs d’Etat africains qui 
devra se réunir en janvier 2006 au Soudan.96  
 
I am going to put Africa at the front of its responsibilities [the 
AU’s] in presenting the dossier on Hissène Habré at the Summit of 
the African Union which will be meeting in January 2006 in 
Sudan. 
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President Wade’s comment that he is putting Africa at the front of its responsibilities is in 
keeping to his statement that the Habré case is an African question. By presenting the 
Habré dossier to the AU, rather than honoring the Belgian extradition order, President 
Wade is agreeing with the argument that the Habré case is important to maintaining 
Africa’s sovereignty. This can be seen in his statement that he is putting Africa and not 
the case, although that is really what he is referring to, at the front of the issues the AU 
leaders will be discussing at the summit. This sentiment is reinforced in another quote 
from President Wade: 
Des affaires comme celle-là sont des affaires africaines. Il ne 
faudrait pas qu’on ferme les yeux en faisant la politique de 
l’autruche. L’Afrique devrait avoir des tribunaux pour juger tout ce 
qui peut arriver en Afrique, et ne pas, comme disait l’autre, faire 
filer la patate chaude aux voisins. 
 
Affairs such as this are African affairs. We must not close our eyes 
and practice ostrich politics. Africa should have a tribunal for 
judging what happens in Africa and not, as others have said, pass 
the hot potato to our neighbors. 
 
Ostrich politics is a French term for what happens when politicians figuratively stick their 
heads in the sand. For President Wade, the creation of an African court – like the one 
Cissé refers to and the one announced by the AU – are necessary for judging the actions 
of Africans in Africa. President Wade’s statement goes a step further than Cissé’s; the 
Habré case is an African question but it is up to African leaders, like Wade and the AU, 
to take responsibility for such issues. It is important to note that in both articles, the 
government and its press believe that the Habré case is not simply about whether or not 
Habré is guilty; it is also about Africa’s ability to handle its own affairs. 
 Unlike the articles discussed in the previous section, this article provides little 
background information about the case. This could be bias on the part of the author, not 
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wishing to theoretically confirm the charges against Habré by repeating them as though 
they were already proven fact as is done in the Western media. Most likely, however, the 
lack of details of the case is the result of the fact that the paper’s audience, who after all 
reside in the country where the case is unfolding, is more familiar with the case than the 
international audience. An account of the history of the case may not be necessary. 
 Another pro-AU referral article appearing in Le Soleil is “Affaire Hissène Habré - 
Landing Savané: « La position du gouvernement honore le pays ».” (“Hissene Habré 
Case – Landing Savané: The government’s position honors the country.”) The author, 
Mamadou Cissé who is also the author of the previous article, calls President Wade’s 
decision wise. Cissé quotes Landing Savané, Minister of State at the time: “La position 
du gouvernement honore le pays.” (The government’s position honors the country.) 
According to Cissé, President Wade’s decision puts the responsibility for the case on 
Africa and Africans. The opinions offered in the article are not any different from the 
previous articles: Habré should not be judged in Belgium, President Wade was right in 
referring the case to the AU, and the decision keeps responsibility for the case within 
Africa. The reason this article is significant is because it reinforces this view of the case. 
While it is obviously to the government’s advantage to portray its president’s decision as 
the right thing to do, the position taken by the government highlights the political 
dimension of the case. 
 The Habré case is not unique in its political dimensions. Given the nature of the 
alleged offenses, war crimes trials tend to be high profile cases where politics can play an 
important role. In his essay, “Law and Politics in Subsequent Nuremberg Trials, 1946-
1949,” Jonathan Friedman discusses the politics at play during the original war crimes 
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case. Friedman notes that a shift in U.S. policy toward Germany from occupation and 
denazification to reconstruction and integration led to public apathy on the part of the 
American people: “Accordingly, many observers began to feel that in this new context 
the prosecution of former Nazis had become counterproductive, if not entirely 
pointless.”97 Friedman argues that this shift in policy was influenced by the developing 
Cold War: “I would argue that political considerations played at least some role from the 
very beginning; whether this involved situating the trials within the overall strategy of 
denazification or containing communism.” Friedman is careful to note, however, that it is 
not his intention to imply that the decisions of the tribunals were politically motivated; 
“Even so, one could hardly have failed to notice the political significance of the 
decisions, especially in the industrialist cases, where a strict application of the law 
dovetailed conveniently with the need to employ German industry in the struggle against 
communism.”  
 Freidman also argues that the American need for steel during the Korean War 
may have been a determining factor in clemency rulings in several of the industrialist 
cases. Freidman suggests that the U.S. government needed to rebuild German industry 
during the Cold War and that in order to be able to do so on American terms, the 
government needed the support of West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, support 
which could be secured through court decisions that were favored by the German public. 
The U.S. therefore, potentially stood to benefit politically from its decisions in the cases. 
It is unclear what political advantages or disadvantages participation in the Habré 
case could pose to Senegal. In fact, given the 2006 UN ruling, it would seem that it would 
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be to Senegal’s advantage to try Habré. Habré has been accused of fleeing Chad with the 
contents of the country’s treasury and using that money to buy political allies in Senegal, 
which could explain the government’s apparent reluctance to go forward with the trial.98 
The government may also be reluctant to move forward with a trial that would in all 
likelihood – if the accusations made by human rights activists are true – indict current 
members of the Chadian government, Senegal’s neighbor, including the country’s 
president. An indictment of these officials, coupled with a guilty ruling for Habré, could 
produce diplomatic tensions between the two countries since if Habré were to be found 
guilty of charges also made against members of the Chadian government, the implication 
would be that those government officials should also be tried.  
Meanwhile, President Wade’s claim that he did not want to set the precedent of 
extraditing a former African head of state to stand trial in Europe has merit. The AU 
agreed to deliberate on the case, suggesting that Wade is not the only African leader wary 
of revisiting the colonial past. Additionally, given the AU’s goal – and the international 
community’s high expectations – to mediate conflicts on the continent and establish a 
human rights court of its own, the Habré case is an opportunity for the organization to 
play a decisive role in a high profile human rights case. The president and AU leaders’ 
position on the paper is quoted in international news sources including the New York 
Times and News24.com, suggesting that the international community recognizes the 
merits of the position taken in the African sovereignty frame. Unfortunately, the 
legitimacy of the arguments in the African sovereignty frame is undermined by questions 
concerning the government’s true motives. The government may genuinely believe in the 
                                               
98 “Senegal doubts over Habré trial” BBC News 18 August 2008: 1-1. 
 81 
arguments it is putting forth or it may be using these arguments to hide the fact that the 
government does not want to take a stand in the case. 
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V 
The Habré Legacy99 
Conclusion and Epilogue 
 
 In July 2006, the African Union concluded that Habré should be tried in Senegal, 
a decision that President Wade accepted. Nearly three years later, the Habré trial has still 
not taken place.  There are several explanations – not necessarily mutually exclusive – 
that have been offered for this delay.  One is that the Senegalese government faces legal 
and financial difficulties in putting Habré on trial. The government has had to pass laws, 
including an amendment to its constitution, to allow the trial to take place. Additionally, 
Madicke Niang, the Justice Minister of Senegal, has stated that putting Habré on trial 
would cost the country an estimated 18 billion CFA francs or approximately 43 million 
dollars.100 Niang has asked for international aid in raising said funds, but Human Rights 
Watch has reported that several countries have offered to provide financial support but 
Senegal has yet to provide any of these countries with a budget.101 
There are other recent events that have also played a role in the delay. On August 
15, 2008, Habré was sentenced to death in absentia by Chad for armed rebellion. 
According to BBC News, Niang expressed doubts over the legality of Habré’s pending 
trial in Senegal, claiming that Habré could not be judged twice on the same facts. Human 
rights activists refute this claim, arguing that the human rights abuse charges Habré is 
facing in Senegal are different. This claim is supported by the Chadian government, 
which has also stated that its case and the case pending in Senegal are unrelated.102 The 
BBC’s Tidiane Sy is suspicious of Niang’s statements, alleging that the Senegalese 
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government has long shown reluctance to try Habré and that this latest statement from 
Niang may be an attempt to find a way out of the trial or at least delay it.103   
Human rights organizations have continued in their efforts to bring Habré to trial. 
In September 2008, new complaints were filed against Habré with a Senegalese 
prosecutor but according to Human Rights Watch, the Senegalese authorities have 
refused to act on the complaints. In November 2008, the UN Committee against Torture 
met with the Senegalese ambassador in Geneva to express its frustration that Senegal had 
not complied with its 2006 ruling.104 In February, 2009, Human Rights Watch reported 
that five African and international human rights organizations called on the United 
Nations Human Rights Council and the African Union to ask Senegal to move forward 
with the case. These five organizations are the original organizations involved in the case: 
the Chadian Association for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights, the Chadian 
Association of Victims of Political Repression and Crime, Human Rights Watch, the 
African Assembly for the Defense of Human Rights, and the International Federation of 
Human Rights. Souleymane Guengueng stated, “Senegal has mocked us for 18 years and 
now it is mocking the United Nations […] The Human Rights Council needs to tell 
Senegal to comply with the UN ruling and bring Habré to justice.”105  
In March 2009, Belgium brought a case against Senegal in the International Court 
of Justice. Belgium has asked the ICJ to issue an interim ruling that would require 
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Senegal to guarantee that they will not allow Habré to flee the country and to compel the 
country to either extradite or try Habré.106 The ICJ has agreed to hear the case. 
Gamson and Wolfsfeld write that events take their significance from the narrative 
or storyline in which they embedded.107 An analysis of the media coverage of the Habré 
case during the period between September 2005 and July 2006 revealed two media 
frames: the human rights frame and the African sovereignty frame. Human rights 
activists embedded the events of the case into a narrative focused on the pursuit of 
justice. The abuses suffered by the prisoners and Habré’s responsibility for these abuses 
were emphasized. Additionally, the significance of the Habré case to the development of 
international criminal and human rights law was also discussed in detail. The main 
objectives of the human rights frame were to raise public awareness and support for 
Habré’s prosecution. The activists responded to the controversy surrounding the Belgian 
extradition order by emphasizing the role played by African activists and what the case 
means for Africa. 
 That the AU’s decision was met with cautious optimism by the activists is proof 
of their experience with both the Habré case and human rights cases in general. Three 
years later, Habré still has not appeared in court. Within the human rights frame this 
means that justice has still not been achieved. The agents within the human rights frame 
are still advocating for Habré to be tried and are still working to keep the case in the 
public eye, but they have altered their strategy to address the current issues stalling the 
trial. The major issue is establishing that the death sentence issued in the Chadian court is 
based on unrelated charges and therefore does not interfere with the case pending in 
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Senegal.108 Additionally, human rights activists are attempting to convince the United 
Nations and the African Union to get involved by urging the two organizations to put 
pressure on Senegal.109 
 The authors of the human rights frame are clearly biased in favor of Habré 
standing trial; however, their motives behind framing the case in such a way are 
transparent, making an analysis of the Habré narrative easier to make than an analysis of 
the African sovereignty frame. Given the reports of suspected government interference 
and delays in the more impartial media accounts, it is difficult to not regard the 
arguments made in the African sovereignty frame with some skepticism. The main 
arguments of the African sovereignty frame are that the Habré case is an African question 
and should therefore be turned over to the African Union. The AU’s involvement is seen 
as an opportunity for Africa to both combat Western interference and strengthen Africa’s 
position in the international community. Belgium’s colonial past and the West’s own 
guilt in human rights abuses – including its role in the Habré case – are offered as proof 
that President Wade made the right decision in turning the case over to the AU. 
 These arguments are found in the state-run newspaper of Senegal Le Soleil. While 
the arguments made in the African sovereignty frame are corroborated in more impartial 
media coverage, the fact that the arguments are being made by such a biased source – and 
one that is suspected of being reluctant to try Habré – makes one question the true 
reasons behind the arguments. The argument that the Habré case is an African question 
may be an attempt by the government to demonstrate that Africa is capable of leading in 
human rights case or it may be an attempt by the government to shirk its legal 
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obligations. The main argument of the African sovereignty frame is certainly valid; a 
former African head of state being extradited to Europe to stand trial does have certain 
neo-colonial undertones and if an African country is capable of giving Habré a fair trial 
then that would be the ideal situation. Unfortunately, this argument is hurt by suspicions 
that the Senegalese government has interfered negatively in the case. 
 An analysis of the media coverage of the Habré case therefore reveals that the 
case against Hissène Habré is not simply an effort to try a former head of state accused of 
human rights abuses; it is also a study in the complexities and issues facing international 
criminal law today. The scope of universal jurisdiction and accountability will no doubt 
be influenced by the eventual outcome of the trial. The effectiveness of the African 
Union in mediating conflicts and the relationship between the West and Africa will also 
likely be affected by if and where Habré is eventually tried. Given the fact that as of 
today, no trial has taken place, just what kind of affect the Habré case will have on these 
issues remains to be seen. 
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